Chicago-Kent College of Law

Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law
All Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Scholarship

January 2012

Diversity Within Racial Groups and the Constitutionality of Race
Conscious Admissions
Vinay Harpalani
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, vharpala@kentlaw.iit.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons

Recommended Citation
Vinay Harpalani, Diversity Within Racial Groups and the Constitutionality of Race Conscious Admissions,
15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 563 (2012).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol/275

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact
jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

Vinay Harpalani - Diversity Within Racial Groups

1

Diversity Within Racial Groups and the Constitutionality of Race Conscious Admissions
Vinay Harpalani
Article forthcoming in Volume 15 of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional
Law, Fall 2012. Address correspondence to vinay.harpalani@gmail.com.



Copyright © 2012 by Vinay Harpalani, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law. J.D.,
2009, New York University School of Law; Ph.D., 2005, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank
Professors Robert Chang, Deborah Malamud, Brant Lee, Kevin Brown, Charlotte Garden, Adam Cox, and Kenji
Yoshino, along with Brian Burgess, Evelyn Malave, and attendees at the 2011 John Mercer Langston Writing
Workshop, for their insightful comments on various drafts of this Article. I am grateful for excellent research
support from Kathryn Kuhlenberg and Ryan Mitchell, and for valuable assistance with my presentations from
Adrienne Lucas. Professors Cristina Rodríguez, Helen Hershkoff, Sylvia Law, Norman Dorsen, Paulette Caldwell,
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Mario Barnes, Tamara Lawson, Natasha Martin, and Troy McKenzie also supported me
in various ways through the course of this project. The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality provided
financial and logistical support for this work from August 2010 to May 2012, while I was the Korematsu Teaching
Fellow at Seattle University School of Law. Finally, this Article is dedicated to Professor Derrick Bell, who passed
away on October 5, 2011. In Fall 2009, when I was the Derrick Bell Fellow at New York University School of Law,
Professor Bell and I faced each other in an appellate oral argument, as a demonstration for the first class of his
Current Constitutional Issues seminar. The case we argued, chosen by Professor Bell, was Fisher v. Texas, which
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Abstract
This Article offers a novel doctrinal resolution of the key issues in Fisher v. Texas, the
impending Supreme Court case which involves race conscious admissions policies at the
University of Texas at Austin (UT). The resolution proposed here addresses Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s concerns about race conscious policies, but also preserves most of the Court’s 2003
Grutter v. Bollinger ruling, in spite of the fact that Justice Kennedy dissented in Grutter.
Substantively, the Article clarifies the key issues in Fisher (the meaning of “critical mass” and
the scope of deference that courts give to universities) by focusing on a simple idea that
permeates Grutter and Fisher but has not been analyzed in the scholarly literature to date: the
significance of diversity within racial groups. It argues that under Grutter, a race conscious
policy can aim not only to increase minority representation overall, but also to increase diversity
within racial groups. Moreover, the Article contends that diversity within racial groups is key to
understanding the constitutionality of race conscious admissions policies for several reasons: 1.
Within-group diversity elucidates clearly how a “critical mass” of minority students is different
from numerical goals and quotas; 2. Within-group diversity directly reflects the compelling
interest in educational diversity at the classroom level that was articulated in Grutter—the
breakdown of racial stereotypes and the facilitation of cross-racial understanding through
admission of a “critical mass”; 3. A holistic admissions policy that emphasizes within-group
diversity reduces the stigmatic harm of race conscious measures; and 4. Attaining diversity
within racial groups necessitates a degree of deference to universities in their admissions
policies. Nevertheless, after reviewing the basic substantive issues in Fisher, the Article also
illustrates how the Fifth Circuit could have been less deferential to UT in its Fisher ruling. It
distinguishes between three different categories of deference to universities—implementation of
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race conscious policies, educational objectives related to racial diversity, and need for race
conscious policies—and analyzes the appropriate standard of review for each. The third
category, need for race conscious policies, is the issue at play in Fisher, and the Article contends
that Justice Kennedy’s view on this issue will be outcome determinative in Fisher. The Article
then proposes a different analysis to decide Fisher—the “unique contribution to diversity” test—
which focuses on within-group diversity and applies strict scrutiny rather than the “good faith”
standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit. These distinctions are directly reflective of the concerns
raised in Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent. Finally, the Article highlights a key values conflict
that Justice Kennedy will face when deciding Fisher: the tension the case presents between
diversity in higher education and racial segregation in K-12 schooling.
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Introduction
In the fall of 2012, when it hears the case of Fisher v. Texas,1 the U.S. Supreme Court
will revisit one of the most contentious issues it has decided in recent decades: the
constitutionality of race conscious admissions policies in higher education. In 2003, a fractured
Court upheld such policies in Grutter v. Bollinger,2 with a 5-4 majority opinion authored by
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. While Grutter was clear in its approval of race conscious policies
and educational diversity as a compelling interest, it left open some contentious questions: the
meaning of a “critical mass” of minority students and the scope of deference given to universities
regarding the use of race conscious policies. These will be the key issues when the Court
decides Fisher and determines the constitutionality of the University of Texas at Austin’s (UT)
undergraduate admissions policy.
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s swing vote will now likely be outcome determinative in
Fisher.3 Justice Kennedy dissented from the holding in Grutter,4 but he did not completely

1

Fisher v. Texas, 631 F.3d 213 (2011)(en banc denied), cert. granted (February 21, 2012)(No. 11-345),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/11-00345qp.pdf
2
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
3
Justice Elena Kagan has recused herself from Fisher because of her role in the case, as Solicitor General, when it
was still in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Based on their prior jurisprudence, Justices
Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, along with Chief Justice Roberts, will likely vote to overturn
Fisher and even Grutter. See generally Grutter at 346-87 (Scalia, J. dissenting; Thomas, J., dissenting)(expressing
disdain for the Grutter majority’s approval of race conscious admissions policies); Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (Chief Justice Robert’s majority opinion, joined by Justice
Alito, striking down race conscious admissions policy.). Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia
Sotomayor will likely vote to uphold the Fifth Circuit’s Fisher ruling. See generally Grutter at 311-45 (majority
opinion upholding race conscious admissions policy joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg); Charlie Savage,
Videos Shed New Light on Sotomayor’s Positions, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, at A17,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/us/politics/11judge.html (noting that Justice Sotomayor “once described
herself as ‘a product of affirmative action’ and “thought it was ‘critical that we promote diversity …’.”). If Justice
Kennedy votes with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, the Court would vote to a 4-4 tie and automatically
affirm the Fifth Circuit opinion in Fisher. Thus, Justice Kennedy’s resolution of the case will be key. See also
Allen Rostron, Affirmative Action, Justice Kennedy, and the Virtues of the Middle Ground, 107 NW. U. L. REV
COLLOQUY 74, 77 (2012)(noting that when the Supreme Court decides Fisher v. Texas, “Justice Kennedy’s vote
would carry the day regardless of whether Kagan participates in the case.”).
4
Grutter at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The question presented to the Supreme Court in Fisher is narrowly
framed to include Grutter as precedent: “Whether this Court’s decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, including Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), permit the University of Texas at
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rebuff the use of race as an admissions factor;5 moreover, his race and equal protection
jurisprudence has been evolving over time.6 So the overarching question in Fisher is how much,
if at all, will Justice Kennedy curb the use of race conscious policies?7 And the answer to this
question depends on Justice Kennedy’s view of the two key issues in Fisher: “critical mass” and
deference.

Austin’s use of race in undergraduate admissions decisions.”). See http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/1100345qp.pdf. Thus, Justice Kennedy and the Court might not reconsider Grutter itself, but just aim to clarify it.
5
Grutter at 392-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as
one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity …”). Moreover, although Justice Kennedy dissented in
Grutter, he did agree with the Grutter majority’s affirmance of Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See Grutter at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“The opinion
by Justice Powell, in my view, states the correct rule for deciding the case … Justice Powell’s approval of the use of
race in university admissions reflected a tradition, grounded in the First Amendment, of acknowledging a
university’s conception of its on educational massion.”). In Bakke, four Justices voted to strike down the University
of California at Davis Medical School special admissions program, which set aside 16 of 100 spots in each admitted
class for members of minority groups, and four Justice voted to uphold the admissions policy. Justice Powell voted
to strike down the UC-Davis program, but wrote that race could be used as a “plus factor” for achieving the
compelling state interest of diversity in education. Powell’s concurring opinion was cited as support for this
proposition in Grutter. Grutter at 307 (“[T]he Court endorses Justice Powell's view
that student body diversity is a compelling state interest in the context of university admissions.”).
6
See Heather Gerkin, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104, 130
(2007)(noting that “Justice Kennedy's opinions in LULAC and Parents Involved invite us to abandon our monolithic
stories about race and think about equal protection in domain-centered terms.”). Professor Gerkin also observes that
in Parents Involved, “Justice Kennedy makes a remarkably similar argument [to Justice O'Connor's argument in
Grutter] … even observing that public schools could use a Grutter-like admissions policy as a last resort.”). Id. at
117. See also Parents Involved at 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)(“ [A]
district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population. Race may be one component of
that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered.”).
7
Other commentators also note that Justice Kennedy will probably not completely preclude the use of race in
admissions. See, e.g.,Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Diversity Paradox: Judicial Review in an Age of Demographic
and Educational Change, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 113, 117 (2012)(noting that in Fisher, “the decisive vote of
Justice Anthony Kennedy … likely will preclude repudiation of Grutter’s central holding.”); Lyle Denniston,
Constitution Check: Is Affirmative Action in College Admissions Doomed?(Feburary 23, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lyle-denniston/affirmative-action_b_1294671.html, (“Looking back to what
Kennedy wrote in dissent in 2003, he recalled with approval Justice Powell's view that a university admissions
program ‘may take account of race as one, nonpredominant factor in a system designed to consider each applicant as
an individual,’ … Justice Kennedy has been somewhat more flexible on race issues than some of his conservative
colleagues, and he may not yet be ready to cast aside altogether the use of race as ‘one, nonpredominant factor …’).
Some commentators have also contended that Justice Kennedy will very likely narrow the scope of race conscious
admissions in Fisher. See Rostron, supra note 3, at 78 (contending that in Fisher, “the most likely outcome is that
Kennedy will … refus[e] to put a complete stop to affirmative action, but insist[] … that rigorous strict scrutiny
really and truly will apply.”); Vikram D. Amar, Is Honesty the Best (Judicial) Policy in Affirmative Action Cases?
Fisher v. University of Texas Gives the Court (Yet) Another Chance to Say Yes (April 2012). VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC, 2012 Forthcoming; UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 298. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2064995 (contending that “the most likely Fisher result is … one in which the window for
race-based affirmative action in higher education will be narrowed, but left ever-so-slightly open.”)(footnote
omitted).
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This Article offers a novel doctrinal resolution of the key issues in Fisher—a resolution
which preserves most of the Grutter holding but also addresses the concerns in Justice
Kennedy’s Grutter dissent. The Article clarifies the meaning of “critical mass” and the scope of
deference given to universities by focusing on a simple idea that permeates Grutter and Fisher
but which has not been explicated to date: the significance of diversity within racial groups.8 It
argues that a race conscious policy can aim not only to increase minority representation overall,
but also to increase diversity within racial groups—a point which has not been analyzed in
scholarly discourse on Grutter or Fisher. Moreover, the Article contends that diversity within
racial groups is key to understanding the constitutionality of race conscious admissions policies
for several reasons: 1. Within-group diversity elucidates how “critical mass” of minority students
is different from numerical goals and quotas; 2. Within-group diversity directly reflects the
compelling interest in educational diversity at the classroom level that was articulated in
Grutter—the breakdown of racial stereotypes and the facilitation of cross-racial understanding
8

This Article will use the phrases “diversity within racial groups” and “within-group diversity” interchangeably.
Both refer to the variety of viewpoints and experiences that exist among members of the same racial group. It
should be noted that while the implications of within-group diversity for the constitutionality of race conscious
admissions have not considered, there has been scholarly attention to within-group diversity in admissions from a
social justice perspective. For example, Professors Kevin Brown and Jeanine Bell advocate for universities to
distinguish between different Black groups, such as Black immigrants (from Africa and the Caribbean), multiracial
persons, Black Latinos, and African Americans, when implementing their race conscious admissions policies. See
Kevin Brown & Jeanine Bell, Demise of the Talented Tenth: Affirmative Action and the Increasing
Underrepresentation of Ascendant Blacks at Selective Higher Educational Institutions, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1231
(2008)(questioning admissions policies “that lump[ ] all blacks into a single-category approach that pervades
admissions decisions of so many selective colleges, universities, and graduate programs.”). Professors Brown and
Bell further note that given “the growing percentage of blacks with a white parent and foreign-born black
immigrants and their sons and daughters” at selective institutions, “blacks whose predominate racial and ethnic
heritage is traceable to the historical oppression of blacks in the U.S. are far more underrepresented than
administrators, admissions committees, and faculties realize.”). Id. See also Kevin Brown, Should Black
Immigrants Be Favored Over Black Hispanics and Black Multiracials in the Admissions Processes of Selective
Higher Education Programs?, 54 How. L.J. 255, 302 (2011)(arguing that “admissions committees of selective
higher education institutions should not provide treatment that is more favorable to Black immigrant applicants …
.”). Professors Henry Louis Gates and Lani Guinier have raised similar concerns. See Cara Anna, Immigrants
among blacks at colleges raises diversity questions, BOSTON GLOBE, April 30, 2007,
http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/04/30/immigrants_among_blacks_at_colleges_raises_d
iversity_questions/?page=2 (“The issue of native vs. immigrant blacks took hold at Harvard in 2004, when
professors Henry Louis Gates and Lani Guinier pointed out at a black alumni reunion that a majority of attendees
were of African or Caribbean origin.”).
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through admission of a “critical mass”; 3. A holistic admissions policy that emphasizes withingroup diversity reduces the stigmatic harm of race conscious measures; and 4. Attaining diversity
within racial groups necessitates a degree of deference to universities in their admissions
policies. Nevertheless, after reviewing the basic substantive issues in Fisher,9 the Article also
illustrates how the Fifth Circuit could have been less deferential to UT in its Fisher ruling, and it
proposes a different method for resolving the case.
Part I provides the background on Grutter’s holding that enrollment of a “critical mass”
of minority students is a compelling state interest. This Part illustrates that the chief educational
benefits of diversity espoused in Grutter are the breakdown of racial stereotypes and the
facilitation of cross-racial understanding—by showing White students that minority students
from each group have a “variety of viewpoints.”10 Consequently, a “critical mass” of minority
students refers not only to numerical representation of racial groups, but also to the diversity of
viewpoints and experiences within each group, which contribute to the educational benefits of
diversity articulated in Grutter. This view of “critical mass” is different from other notions of
the concept that focus narrowly on numbers or define it by feelings of isolation encountered by
minority students. Thus, this Part shows how “critical mass” is distinct from numerical goals
and quotas, which was a one of Justice Kennedy’s key concerns in his Grutter dissent.
Ultimately, this Part argues that “critical mass” is not a measurable entity—it is a concept which

9

This Article analyzes the merits issues in Fisher; it does not address procedural challenges, including standing and
mootness, that UT raised in its response to the Plaintiff’s cert petition. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Fisher, (No. 11-345). Available at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Fisher.BIO.Final.12.7.2011.pdf. For
a discussion of these issues, see Amar, supra note 7, at 12-18; Adam D. Chandler, How (Not) to Bring an
Affirmative-Action Challenge (August 2, 2012). 122 Yale Law Journal 2012 Forthcoming; Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2122956 (arguing that there are significant procedural defects in Fisher v. Texas).
10
Grutter at 319-20 (“[W]hen a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes lose
their force because nonminority students learn there is no 'minority viewpoint' but rather a variety of viewpoints
among minority students.”).
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articulates a university’s compelling interest in diversity, not part of the narrow tailoring test for
race conscious admissions policies.
Part II expands upon this discussion by showing how within-group diversity and “critical
mass” are related to Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles—thus illustrating the internal logic and
coherence of a much maligned Grutter majority opinion.11 It argues that Grutter’s narrow
tailoring principles aim to minimize the stigmatic harm12 of race conscious policies, by ensuring
that members of the same racial group are given individualized consideration and not treated in
exactly the same manner—the “least stigmatic means” theory of narrow tailoring. 13 This Part
also argues that in addition to its educational benefits, within-group diversity helps to minimize
stigmatic harm. As such, within-group diversity links “critical mass” and narrow tailoring and
highlights the internal logic and coherence of the Grutter majority opinion. Furthermore, a race
conscious policy can aim not only to increase representation of different racial groups, but also to
generate diversity within racial groups. Finally, the analysis in this Part illustrates how withingroup diversity and narrow tailoring are related to courts’ deference to universities decisions in
determining their admissions policies.

11

See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Grutter and Fisher: A Reassessment and a Preview, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 57,
64 (2012)(discussing “problems with and perverse implications of the student body diversity rationale Grutter
adopts for justifying the use of racial preferences in the context of higher education students admissions.”); Roger
Clegg, Attacking “Diversity”: A Review of Peter Wood's Diversity: The Invention of a Concept, 31 J.C. & U.L. 417,
431 (2005) (claiming that “the Grutter Court relied on this rather convoluted reasoning” in its articulation of
diversity as a compelling interest.); Fisher at 247 (Garza, J., specially concurring)(“Grutter represents a digression in
the course of constitutional law … .”)oral Even proponents of affirmative action have been critical of Grutter’s
emphasis on diversity instead of racial justice. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1622, 1622 (2003)(“[T]he concept of diversity, far from a viable means of ensuring affirmative action in the
admissions policies of colleges and graduate schools, is a serious distraction in the ongoing efforts to achieve racial
justice.”).
12
Stigmatic harm is the constitutional harm that occurs when a government policy treats individuals in the same
manner solely because of their race. For a more detailed discussion of stigmatic harm, see infra Part II.A.
13
This Article argues that reducing the stigmatic harm of race conscious admissions policies is a key facet of
Grutter, particularly for the narrow tailoring requirements and the “critical mass” concept. See Part II.B. It does
not, however, take a normative stance on whether reducing such stigmatic harm should be a major concern.
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Part III focuses the application of “critical mass” and deference in Fisher. It first gives
the background to Fisher, including the Fifth Circuit’s 1996 decision in Hopwood v. Texas,14 the
enactment of the “race neutral”15 Top Ten Percent Law, and the reinstatement of race conscious
admissions after Grutter. Next, this Part considers the parties’ arguments regarding “critical
mass” and deference, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling on these issues, and Chief Judge Jones’s critique
of this ruling in her dissent to the denial of an en banc hearing in Fisher. It then critiques the
application of “critical mass” in Fisher, concluding that “critical mass” and numerical goals were
indistinguishable in the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the case. Moreover, this Part also illustrates
how the Fisher panel’s deference to UT did not leave sufficient room for judicial review. In the
process, this Part underscores how “critical mass” and deference will be key points for Justice
Kennedy when deciding Fisher.
Part IV addresses standard of review and deference in detail. It lays out three categories
of review with respect to deference to universities: 1. Review of the actual implementation of
race conscious policies as implemented, which requires strict scrutiny; 2. Review of whether the
university’s educational objective encompasses racial diversity (essentially, whether the
university has a compelling interest in diversity), which requires only “good faith” on the part of
the university; and 3. Review of whether race conscious admissions policies are needed to attain
this educational objective, which is the core issue in Fisher and the source of controversy.
14

78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
This Article presumes, as the Fisher litigation did, that the Top Ten Percent Law is “race neutral”—meaning that
there is no direct and explicit consideration of race in the decision-making process. But see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 303 n.10 (2003)(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)(“Calling … 10% or 20% plans ‘race-neutral’ seems to me
disingenuous, for they ‘unquestionably were adopted with the specific purpose of increasing representation of
African-Americans and Hispanics in the public higher education system.’”). See also Fisher at 242n.156 (“A court
considering the constitutionality of the [Top Ten Percent Law] would examine whether Texas enacted the Law (and
corresponding admissions policies) because of its effects on identifiable racial groups or in spite of those effects. See
Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979); cf. Brief of Social Scientists
Glenn C. Loury et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S.Ct.
2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304 (2003), available at 2003 WL 402129, at *2, *9–*10 (noting that ‘it is not clear that
[percentage] plans are actually race-neutral’ and that some amici counsel in Grutter ‘have signaled interest in
moving on after this case to challenge these aspects of the Texas program’).”).
15
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Focusing on the third category, this Part distinguishes between ex ante deference (before a
university applies a race neutral policy to increase diversity) and ex post deference (after a
university applies a race neutral policy to increase diversity, as is the case in Fisher after the Top
Ten Percent Law was implemented). This Part then contends that after a race neutral
admissions policy has been implemented, it is easier for courts to review the effectiveness of that
policy and thus to apply a higher standard of review such as strict scrutiny.
Part V proposes an alternative method to decide Fisher, the “unique contribution to
diversity” test, which applies strict scrutiny. The test proposed here does not treat “critical mass”
in terms of numbers; in fact, it focuses on the race conscious admissions policy itself rather than
on “critical mass.” The “unique contribution to diversity” test assesses whether a race conscious
policy contributes to diversity in a manner above and beyond any race neutral measures that are
in place, such as the Top Ten Percent Law in Fisher. The argument here is that UT should have
to demonstrate explicitly that its race conscious policy is used to increase the variety of
viewpoints and experiences among minority students—by admitting minority students in
different majors, or from different cultural or socioeconomic backgrounds who are not admitted
in sufficient numbers via the Top Ten Percent Law. Such a goals-means fit is characteristic of
strict scrutiny. This Part then highlights the advantages of the “unique contribution to diversity”
test and shows how the test addresses Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter. Moreover, the test
proposed here also resolves a values conflict that Justice Kennedy faces in Fisher: the prospect
that a race neutral admissions policy (the Top Ten Percent Law) which generates diversity only
because of rampant racial segregation in public schools, could preclude UT from using race
conscious admissions measures. This conflict is key for Justice Kennedy, who stated that
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“avoiding racial isolation” is a compelling state interest in his concurrence in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.16

I. “Critical Mass” as a Compelling Interest: The Role of Diversity Within Racial Groups
In 2003, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor authored the 5-4 majority opinion in Grutter, in
which the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s holistic admissions policy.17
Grutter adopted Justice Lewis Powell’s concurrence in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,18 which had introduced the idea of diversity in education as a compelling interest.19 The

16

551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007)(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)(stating that “[a]
compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation …”). In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy also critiqued
Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion for its “all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a
factor in instances when, in [Justice Kennedy’s] view, it may be taken into account.” Id. at 787. Justice Kennedy
further asserted that “[t]o the extent the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local
school authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.”
Id. at 788. For an excellent scholarly analysis and critique of Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion in Parents
Involved, see Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 206
(2008)(noting that “[o]nce one seriously looks to the history of colorblind constitutionalism in the struggle that led
to Brown … the shortcomings of the Chief Justice’s account [in Parents Involved] become readily apparent.”).
17
This Article defines a holistic admissions policy as one where various factors, from academic achievement to
extracurricular activities to race, are subjectively considered together and weighed by admissions reviewers to make
admissions decisions. This can be contrasted with an admissions system which gives fixed weights to those various
factors and applies objective, mechanical formulas to determine who should be admitted.
18
438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke, four Justices voted to strike down the University of California at Davis Medical
School special admissions program, which set aside 16 of 100 spots in each admitted c lass for members of minority
groups, and four Justice voted to uphold the admissions policy. Justice Lewis Powell voted to strike down the UCDavis program, but wrote that race could be used as a “plus factor” for the compelling state interest of achieving
diversity in education. Id. at 317-18 (Powell, J.). Subsequent to the Court’s ruling in Bakke, Powell’s concurring
opinion was cited as support for the use of race as one of many “plus” factors in an admissions process.
19
Id. at 311-12 (Powell, J., concurring)(finding that “the attainment of a diverse student body … clearly is a
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”). In his Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy
also made it clear that he did not object to the use of race in admissions to obtain the educational benefits of
diversity. See Grutter at 387-88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“The [Bakke concurring] opinion by Justice Powell, in
my view, states the correct rule for resolving [Grutter]. … Justice Powell's approval of the use of race in university
admissions reflected a tradition, grounded in the First Amendment, of acknowledging a university's conception of its
educational mission. … Our precedents provide a basis for the Court's acceptance of a university's considered
judgment that racial diversity among students can further its educational task …”); See also id. at 392-93
(Kennedy, J., concurring)(“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as one modest factor
among many others to achieve diversity …”).
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Court held that a holistic admissions policy could use race as one, flexible factor, for the purpose
of admitting a “critical mass” of minority students.20 But what exactly is a “critical mass”?21
This is a key question in understanding the constitutionality of race conscious
admissions; yet, the answer remains elusive. At the trial stage of Fisher v. Texas, Judge Sam
Sparks of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas noted that “this esoteric
critical mass of diversity of students”22 was a concept that “kept eluding him.”23 This Part
reviews and critiques some different interpretations of the “critical mass” concept. Then,
drawing upon Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter, it argues that a “critical mass”
refers to the diversity of viewpoints and experiences within racial groups. Such within-group
diversity is related to the specific compelling interest in diversity articulated in Grutter: the
breakdown of racial stereotypes and promotion of cross-racial understanding.24

20

Grutter at 308 (holding that “the Law School defines its critical mass concept by reference to the substantial,
important, and laudable educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce, including cross-racial
understanding and the breaking down of racial stereotypes. … Thus, the Law School has a compelling interest in
attaining a diverse student body.”).
21
See Adeno Addis, The Concept of Critical Mass in Legal Discourse, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 97 (2007)(discussing
uses of “critical mass” concept in law). Professor Addis notes that “[i]n the scientific world, the [term “critical
mass”] is used to refer to the precise minimum level of fissionable plutonium or uranium that is required to start and
sustain a chain reaction of nuclear fission which will in turn lead to explosion.” Id. at 98. Professor Addis goes on
to observe that:
While there is a degree of certainty as to what the phrase refers in the scientific realm, there does not seem
to be such clarity in relation to the application of the phrase in the social and political world. .. [I]t may
even be that its popularity is … partly a function of its vagueness and elasticity that allow people to
invoke it in various activities of social and political life. Sometimes the phrase is used to refer to specific
and empirically verifiable minimum numbers of people or levels of resources required for a social activity
to succeed… [o]ther times, however, the phrase seems to be used not as an analogy but as a metaphor,
simply to indicate that people's actions or behavior depend on what others do or on what they expect others
to do without an attempt to specify whether there is a minimum number or level of resource to trigger those
actions or behavior. Id. at 99.
Professor Addis’s observations here show the flaws in directly analogizing between the scientific and social realms.
This Article contends that the meaning of “critical mass” is context-specific, and that in Grutter, “critical mass” was
intended merely as a metaphor to capture the notion of diversity within racial groups. See infra Part I.C.
22
Adam Liptak, College Diversity Nears its Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES, October 16, 2011, at SR4.
23
Id.
24
See Grutter at 330 (“[T]he Law School's admissions policy promotes ‘cross-racial understanding,’ helps to break
down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better understand persons of different races.’”). But see Grutter
at 389, (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“[T]he concept of critical mass is … used … to achieve numerical goals
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A. Rejecting “Critical Mass” as a Racial Quota or Numerical Goal
Critics of the Grutter ruling have viewed the concept of “critical mass” solely in
numerical terms. For example, Professor Lino Graglia argues that “[i]t is difficult to see, in any
event, how a ‘critical mass,’ some minimum number of a racial group, avoids being a quota by
not being more specifically defined.”25 In his Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy also stated that
“critical mass is a delusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an
automatic factor in most instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from
quotas.”26 Independent of the University of Michigan Law School’s practices, however, it is
important to delineate the theoretical distinction between “critical mass” and numerical goals.
The Grutter majority affirmed Bakke’s rejection of racial quotas;27 thus, it could not have
adopted a definition of “critical mass” based solely, or even primarily, on numbers or
percentages of minority students. Justice O’Connor’s opinion noted that “[e]nrolling a ‘critical
mass’ of minority students simply to assure some specified percentage of a particular group
merely because of its race or ethnic origin would be patently unconstitutional.”28 The Grutter
majority did distinguish between a strict quota and a “permissible goal”;29 however, Justice

indistinguishable from quotas.”). Justice Kennedy’s concern here underscores the need to clarify how “critical
mass” is different from numerical goals.
25
Lino A. Graglia, Grutter and Gratz: Race Preference to Increase Racial Representation Held “Patently
Unconstitutional” Unless Done Subtly Enough in the Name of Pursuing “Diversity”, 78 Tul. L. Rev. 2037, 2048
(2004). See also Chief Justice Rehnquist’s view of “critical mass,” infra note 55 and accompanying text.
26
Grutter at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy’s concern reflected the University of Michigan’s use of
“critical mass” in practice, not an underlying concern with the theory of “critical mass” as entailing within-group
diversity. See id. at 389-90 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(discussing how the University of Michigan School of Law’s
admissions numbers from 1987-1998 suggested that the school used numerical goals or racial quotas.). Parts IV and
V., infra, discuss how courts can review race conscious admissions policies more stringently.
27
Grutter at 334 (“As Justice Powell made clear in Bakke, truly individualized consideration demands that race be
used in a flexible, nonmechanical way. It follows from this mandate that universities cannot establish quotas for
members of certain racial groups or put members of those groups on separate admissions tracks.”)(internal citation
omitted).
28
Id. at 308.
29
Id. at 335 (“In contrast [to a quota], ‘a permissible goal ... require[s] only a good-faith effort ... to come within a
range demarcated by the goal itself[.]’”)(internal citation omitted).

Vinay Harpalani - Diversity Within Racial Groups

16

Kennedy’s dissent did not accept this subtle distinction,30 and it would likely not survive further
review in Fisher.31 Considering these circumstances, one can posit that Grutter allows “some
attention to numbers,”32 but there must be more to the definition of “critical mass” to distinguish
it from numerical goals.
B. “Critical Mass” as a Counter to Tokenism: A Relevant but Limited View
During the trial phase of Grutter, the University of Michigan Law School contended that
there is “no number, percentage, or range of numbers or percentages that constitute critical
mass,”33 but it noted that “critical mass” entailed “numbers such that underrepresented minority
students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race.”34 Professor Bennett Capers
contends that:
[C]ritical mass is not solely numerical. Rather, a critical mass implies a climate
where one is neither conspicuous nor on display, where one does not feel the
opprobrium of being a token, nor the burden of being the designated
representative for an entire group. It also implies a climate where one can speak
freely, where one not only has a voice, but a voice that will be heard.35

30

Id. at 391 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(noting “obvious tension between the pursuit of critical mass and the
requirement of individual review” in the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policy, and citing the
Law School’s consultation of “daily reports which indicated the composition of the incoming class along racial
lines.”).
31
It is possible the Court could rule solely on the issue of deference to universities and not address the meaning of
“critical mass.” Nevertheless, if the Court does consider the “critical mass” issue, Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent
underscores his problems with the concept. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
32
Id. at 335-36. “The Law School's goal of attaining a critical mass of underrepresented minority students does not
transform its program into a quota. As the Harvard plan described by Justice Powell recognized, there is of course
‘some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body, and
between numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those students admitted.” … [but] … [s]ome attention
to numbers, without more, does not transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid quota.’”
33
Grutter at 318.
34
Id. at 319. The Plaintiffs in Fisher also defined “critical mass” in similar terms. See Br. Pl.s-Appellants 6,
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Plaintiffs.5th.Circuit.Brief.pdf. (arguing that “critical mass” is defined as
“a sufficient number of underrepresented minority students such that such minority students would ‘not feel isolated
or like spokespersons for their race.’”); Fisher at 243 (noting that the Plaintiffs contend that “the concept of critical
mass is defined by the minimum threshold for minority students to have their ideas represented in class discussions
and not to feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race.”).
35
I. Bennett Capers, Flags, 48 How. L.J. 121, 122-23 (2004). Professor Capers presents a more nuanced view,
focusing on the climate for minority students rather than on numbers. This Article agrees with Professor Capers’s
point, but it contends that Grutter defined “critical mass” primarily in terms of the educational benefits of diversity.
It is these educational benefits that are the compelling interest in Grutter. See infra Part II.C.
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It is very important for universities to acknowledge and address feelings of isolation and
tokenism among minority students. But for several reasons, this is not sufficient to define
“critical mass” under Grutter. First, “numbers such that underrepresented minority students do
not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race”36 still implies that “critical mass” can be
defined by numbers, even if these numbers may vary or constitute a range rather than a set
numerical goal. This runs very close to Justice Kennedy’s concern that “critical mass is a
delusion used by the Law School … to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from
quotas.”37 Second, studies suggest that minority students still do feel isolated and alienated on
college campuses,38 so if this is the primary justification for race conscious admissions policies,
then those policies may not be working. This could raise questions about whether universities
are actually fulfilling their compelling interest in diversity.39 Finally, while alleviating feelings
of isolation and tokenism is important to attaining the educational benefits of diversity, the
36

Grutter at 319.
Grutter at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Grutter did attempt to distinguish “critical mass” from racial quotas. Id.
at 335 (“In contrast [to a quota], ‘a permissible goal ... require[s] only a good-faith effort ... to come within a range
demarcated by the goal itself[.]’”)(internal citation omitted). However, Justice Kennedy did not accept this
distinction, and it may well be raised again in Fisher. In the Grutter oral argument, Justice Scalia asked counsel for
the University of Michigan whether two, four, or eight percent constitutes a “critical mass” and followed up by
stating “You have to pick some number, don’t you?” Transcript of Arguments in Grutter v. Bollinger, N.Y. Times,
April 1, 2003, at 11, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/01/politics/02TEXT1.html?pagewanted=11
Counsel for the University of Michigan responded, “No, Your Honor, if it was a fixed range that said that it will be a
minimum of 8 percent, come hell or high water, no matter what the qualifications of these applicants look like, no
matter what it is that the majority applicants could contribute to the benefits of diversity, then certainly that would
be a quota, but that is not what occurred here. And in fact the testimony was undisputed, that this was not intended
to be a fixed goal.” Id. Nevertheless, this Article argues that numbers alone are not sufficient to understand or
apply the “critical mass” concept. From the perspective of this Article, asking what percentage constitutes a “critical
mass” is insufficient because it does not take into account the within-group diversity which is necessary to break
down racial stereotypes and obtain the educational benefits of diversity.
38
See, e.g., Tara Yosso, William Smith, Miguel Ceja, & Daniel Solórzano, Critical Race Theory, Racial
Microaggressions, and Campus Racial Climate for Latina/o Undergraduates, 79 HARV. EDUC. REV. 659, 659
(2009)(examining “processes by which Latinas/os respond to racial microaggressions and confront hostile campus
racial climates.”); Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise:An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning
Affirmative Action, 85 Ind. L.J. 1197, 1233 (2010)(acknowledging “power of creating critical mass and a diverse
classroom” but noting that “stigma and racism … were still present.”).
39
But see infra note 58 and accompanying text (noting that the University of Michigan Law School did not actually
contend that it had enrolled a “critical mass” of minority students, but only that its admissions policy aimed toward
that goal.). It is possible that the Law School never attained an actual “critical mass,” where minority students no
longer felt isolated. This could well be a good argument to expand race conscious policies to admit more minority
students, but Justice Kennedy and the Supreme Court are very unlikely to do so in Fisher.
37
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Grutter majority opinion focused more directly on those educational benefits.40 In order to attain
the educational benefits of diversity, universities must aim to create campus environments where
minority students feel comfortable speaking and interacting with non-minority students. But
from the Grutter majority’s perspective, this is the means rather than the end, and it is not the
defining feature of “critical mass.”41
C. The Grutter Majority’s Functional View of “Critical Mass”: Educational
Benefits of Within-Group Diversity
The Grutter majority further defined “critical mass” in functional terms:
[T]he Law School's concept of critical mass is defined by reference to the
educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce. … These benefits are
substantial. As the District Court emphasized, the Law School's admissions policy
promotes “cross-racial understanding,” helps to break down racial stereotypes,
and “enables [students] to better understand persons of different races.”42
Under this view, “critical mass” refers to a sufficiently diverse group of perspectives within each
racial group to actualize the educational benefits of diversity.43 According to the Grutter
majority, the goal of a race conscious admissions policy should be to produce a “critical mass”
with a “variety of viewpoints among minority students.”44 Such within-group variation
actualizes the educational benefits of diversity, as it serves to break down racial stereotypes:

40

Grutter at 308 (“[T]he Law School defines its critical mass concept by reference to the substantial, important, and
laudable educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce.”). See also Fisher at 219 (noting that “critical
mass” should be defined through “reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce.”). This
Article contends that while the Fisher opinion claimed that “critical mass” should be defined in terms of the
educational benefits of diversity, its application of the concept did not reflect this, and its articulation of these
educational benefits was incomplete. See infra Parts III.B. and III.D. But even the Fisher Plaintiffs agree that
“Grutter endorses an inward-facing concept of diversity that focuses on the functioning of the student body and the
educational benefits that arise from admitting a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minority students [.]” Br. Pl.sAppellants 33, http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Plaintiffs.5th.Circuit.Brief.pdf
41
See infra Part I.C.
42
Grutter at 330.
43
See also id. (“[Educational] benefits [of diversity] are substantial … the Law School's admissions policy promotes
“cross-racial understanding,” helps to break down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better understand
persons of different races.’ … These benefits are ‘important and laudable,’ because ‘classroom discussion is livelier,
more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting’ when the students have ‘the greatest possible variety of
backgrounds.’”).
44
Id. at 320.
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when a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is
present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students learn
there is no “minority viewpoint” but rather a variety of viewpoints among
minority students.45
Grutter’s language thus suggests that “meaningful representation”46 is not just contingent upon
numbers of minority students, but also includes sufficiently diverse experiences and perspectives
within racial groups.47 This allows racial stereotypes to be broken down and facilitates the
educational benefits of diversity, which are the constitutional justification for race conscious
admissions policies in the first place. When understood not only in terms of diverse
representation of racial groups, but also different experiences and perspectives within racial
groups, the concept of a “critical mass” of minority students is directly related to the compelling
interest articulated in Grutter.48
1. Why “Critical Mass” Cannot Be Defined by Minority Student Numbers
This emphasis on within-group diversity also clarifies how “critical mass” is different
from numerical goals or quotas. By definition, diversity within racial groups cannot be attained
45

Id. at 319-20. See also id. at 333 (“The Law School does not premise its need for critical mass on ‘any belief that
minority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.’ … To
the contrary, diminishing the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School's mission, and one
that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.”). This language in Grutter speaks to the
immediate, proximal impact of having a “critical mass.” When evaluating “critical mass” in Fisher, the Fifth Circuit
panel did not cite this language, instead defining the educational benefits of diversity in much broad terms: 1.
“Increased Perspectives” - those brought by diverse groups of students into the classroom, which add valuable
knowledge and make for engaging classroom discussions; 2. “Professionalism” – preparing students for “work and
citizenship” by exposing them to diverse people and viewpoints; and 3. “Civic Engagement” – creating paths to
leadership for individuals of every race and ethnicity. See Fisher at 219-220 and infra notes 183 and 209-211 and
accompanying text.
46
Grutter at 318.
47
Of course, there cannot be sufficient within-group diversity if there are not adequate numbers of a particular
minority group. However, no particular number or percentage of a given racial group automatically guarantees that
within-group diversity is present. That is an assessment that institutions must make themselves.
48
But see Edward C. Thomas, Comment, Racial Classification and the Flawed Pursuit of Diversity: How Phantom
Minorities threaten "Critical Mass" Justification in Higher Education, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 813, 815-16 (arguing
that “phantom minorities,” who take advantage of race conscious admissions policies even though they “look white,
have Anglo names, and come from backgrounds void of racial-life experience,” undermine the “critical mass”
justification for affirmative action.). Thomas’s point underscores the need for admissions committees to consider
race in the context of an applicant’s entire profile, in conjunction with other factors, and to use individualized review
to consider how each applicant contributes to the educational benefits of diversity. Regardless of whether this type
of nuanced review is the current norm in university admissions, this Article argues that it is the standard that courts
should enforce when evaluating universities’ race conscious admissions policies. See infra Part IV.
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merely by admitting particular numbers or percentages of students from each minority group, or
even by monitoring the numbers of students admitted from such groups.49 Within-group
diversity may involve “some attention to numbers,” 50 but universities must consider factors
beyond race to attain a variety of viewpoints and experiences within various racial groups.51
This point is key to addressing Justice Kennedy’s concern about “critical mass,”52 because unlike
the two views of “critical mass” posited earlier,53 within-group diversity cannot conceivably be
defined by a number, percentage, or range of students from a minority group: it cannot be even
expressed be expressed in such terms, as some account of variation within that group is
necessary.54 Moreover, Part II infra will illustrate how Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles
make much more sense in light of this view of “critical mass.”
2. Why “Critical Mass” Can Vary for Different Minority Groups
In his dissenting opinion in Grutter, the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist, joined by
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, raised a more general question about “critical mass”: why
were different numbers of students admitted for different racial groups? Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that:

49

This was another salient concern raised by Justice Kennedy. See Grutter at 392(Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“The
consultation of daily reports during the last stages in the admissions process suggests there was no further attempt at
individual review save for race itself. The admissions officers could use the reports to recalibrate the plus factor
given to race depending on how close they were to achieving the Law School's goal of critical mass. The bonus
factor of race would then become divorced from individual review; it would be premised instead on the numerical
objective set by the Law School.”).
50
Grutter at 336.
51
See infra. Part II.C.
52
See supra notes 26 and 37and accompanying text.
53
See supra Parts I.A and I.B.
54
A quota or numerical goal is obviously expressed as a number or percentage, and there are numbers and
percentages (e.g., 50% or 75%) which would have to be sufficient for group members not to feel isolated—leading
to the inquiry posed by Justice Scalia in the Grutter oral argument: “You have to pick some number, don’t you?”
Transcript of Arguments in Grutter v. Bollinger, N.Y. Times, April 1, 2003, at 11,
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/01/politics/02TEXT1.html?pagewanted=11. See also supra note 37. Withingroup diversity, on the other hand, can never be determined by numbers or percentages. To take an extreme
example, even if 95% of the students in a class are members of a given group, the class might benefit from a
member of that group who has very different viewpoints and experiences.
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[f]rom 1995 through 2000, the Law School admitted between 1,130 and 1,310
students. Of those, between 13 and 19 were Native American, between 91 and
108 were African-American, and between 47 and 56 were Hispanic. If the Law
School is admitting between 91 and 108 African-Americans in order to achieve
“critical mass,” thereby preventing African-American students from feeling
“isolated or like spokespersons for their race,” one would think that a number of
the same order of magnitude would be necessary to accomplish the same purpose
for Hispanics and Native Americans. Similarly, even if all of the Native American
applicants admitted in a given year matriculate, which the record demonstrates is
not at all the case, how can this possibly constitute a “critical mass” of Native
Americans in a class of over 350 students? In order for this pattern of admission
to be consistent with the Law School's explanation of “critical mass,” one would
have to believe that the objectives of “critical mass” offered by respondents are
achieved with only half the number of Hispanics and one-sixth the number of
Native Americans as compared to African-Americans. But respondents offer no
race-specific reasons for such disparities. Instead, they simply emphasize the
importance of achieving “critical mass,” without any explanation of why that
concept is applied differently among the three underrepresented minority
groups.55
Professor Clark Cunningham echoes Chief Justice Rehnquist in lamenting the lack of response
from other Justices to these critiques of the Law School’s admissions numbers.56 Both Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Professor Cunningham assume a numerical definition of “critical mass,”
which the Grutter majority repudiated.57 Nevertheless, there are several possible responses to
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s question.
55

Grutter at 381(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted).
Clark D. Cunningham, After Grutter Things Get Interesting! The American Debate over Affirmative Action is
Finally Ready for Some Fresh Ideas from Abroad, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 665, 670 (2004)(“Although one wonders
whether the Chief Justice actually would have voted to uphold the law school's affirmative action program as long as
it had admitted larger numbers of Hispanic and Native American applicants, the evidence he cited would seem to
call for a response. However, the majority opinion authored by Justice O'Connor did not really respond to either
Justice Kennedy or Chief Justice Rehnquist's concerns.”).
Justice O’Connor did actually respond directly to Chief Justice Rehnquist in her Grutter opinion. 539 U.S.
at 336 (“THE CHIEF JUSTICE believes that the Law School's policy conceals an attempt to achieve racial
balancing, and cites admissions data to contend that the Law School discriminates among different groups within the
critical mass … But, as THE CHIEF JUSTICE concedes, the number of underrepresented minority students who
ultimately enroll in the Law School differs substantially from their representation in the applicant pool and varies
considerably for each group from year to year. “). Justice O’Connor’s response suggests that “critical mass” can
vary because it is not just about numbers of minority students, but about the diverse viewpoints and experiences
within each minority group—a mix that varies substantially from year to year.
57
See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. See also Fisher at 219 (“In his [Grutter] dissent, Chief Justice
Rehnquist saw critical mass as only the minimum level necessary ‘[t]o ensure that the[ ] minority students do not
feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race; to provide adequate opportunities for the type of interaction upon
which the educational benefits of diversity depend; and to challenge all students to think critically and reexamine
56
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First, in Grutter, the University of Michigan Law School did not actually contend that it
had reached a “critical mass” of any minority group, but rather only that its race conscious
admissions policy “seeks” to attain this “goal.”58 It is possible that the number of Native
Americans admitted was limited by the number of Native American applicants. Moreover, even
if there were more Native American applicants who could have been admitted, the University
was limited by the finite consideration it could give to race in the admissions process, lest race
become too large of a factor and render the policy unconstitutional.59 Justice Kennedy in
particular emphasized that race should not be the “predominant factor” in admissions.60 Thus,
the Law School could not have categorically admitted every Native American student without
violating Grutter’s own narrow tailoring principles for race conscious admissions policies.
Attaining a “critical mass” of a minority group was one of the University’s goals, but that goal
had to be balanced with other priorities.61

stereotypes.’ On this view, critical mass is defined only as a proportion of the student body, and the percentage that
suffices for one minority group should also suffice for another group. … In contrast, Justice O'Connor, writing for
the Court [in Grutter], explained that critical mass must be ‘defined by reference to the educational benefits that
diversity is designed to produce.’”)(internal citations omitted).
58
See Grutter at 329 (“As part of its goal of ‘assembling a class that is both exceptionally academically qualified and
broadly diverse,’ the Law School seeks to “enroll a ‘critical mass’ of minority students.”’)(emphasis added). The
University of Michigan Law School’s brief in Grutter also suggests that enrollment of a “critical mass” is a “hope”
rather than an outcome it attains each year. See Brief of Respondents at 13, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 402236 (“[T]he Law School hopes that its policy will enroll a "critical mass" of
minority students.”)(emphasis added).
59
See Grutter at 334 (“To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system-it
cannot ‘insulat[e] each category of applicants with certain desired qualifications from competition with all other
applicants.’ Bakke, 438 U.S., at 315, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.). Instead, a university may consider race
or ethnicity only as a ‘ “plus” in a particular applicant's file,’ without ‘insulat[ing] the individual from comparison
with all other candidates for the available seats.’”).
60
Grutter at 392-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). (“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race
as one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity, but an educational institution must ensure, through
sufficient procedures, that … race does not become a predominant factor in the admissions decisionmaking.”). It
should be noted that the Plaintiff’s expert witness in Grutter conceded that “race is not the predominant
factor in the Law School's admissions calculus.” Id. at 320.
61
See Brief of Respondents at 42-43, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 402236
(“The Law School's desire for a ‘critical mass’ of students from otherwise underrepresented minority groups is only
one of many educational goals pursued through the admissions policy, and it is at all times weighed against other
educational objectives. Dean Lehman and the other trial witnesses testified unequivocally that the Law School
would and does regularly reject qualified minority candidates, even if that risks falling short of a critical mass … .”).
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In that vein, not only is there a limited applicant pool, but there are also a limited number
of spots in any admitted class. An institution must make decisions about which perspectives are
most important to achieving its desired educational benefits, and this can lead to different
numbers of students admitted from various racial groups. As part of its educational autonomy,
an institution must also determine which of many diverse perspectives is most important in
breaking down racial stereotypes and promoting the other educational benefits of diversity.62 For
example, a university in Arizona or New Mexico may determine that more perspectives from
Mexican Americans are necessary, given the large Mexican American populations in those
states. Similarly, an institution in South Dakota may choose to emphasize perspectives from
Native Americans to a greater extent. Local history and social and political dynamics determine
both the prevalence of racial stereotypes in a given area, and the particular mix of perspectives
necessary to help break down those stereotypes and facilitate cross-racial understanding. Even at
elite universities with national student bodies, there is significant variation in local and
institutional history and social dynamics.63

62

Grutter at 329 (“In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a compelling state interest, Justice
Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of educational
autonomy: ‘The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its
student body.’ … From this premise, Justice Powell reasoned that by claiming ‘the right to select those students
who will contribute the most to the “robust exchange of ideas,” ’ a university ‘seek[s] to achieve a goal that is of
paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission.’")(internal citations omitted).
63
For example, some Ivy League universities, such as Yale, Columbia, and the University of Pennsylvania, are
located in urban communities that are predominantly African American, whereas others, such as Cornell and
Dartmouth, are located in rural, predominantly White communities. Moreover, institutional history can also play a
significant role: for example, the charter for Dartmouth aimed to create an institution “for the education and
instruction of Youth of the Indian Tribes in this Land ... and also of English Youth and any others.” See About the
Native American Program, Dartmouth University, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nap/about/ (last updated March 26,
2012). Since 1970, when then President John G. Kemeny of Dartmouth renewed the institution’s commitment to
Native Americans, “nearly 700 Native Americans from over 200 different tribes have attended Dartmouth, more
than at all the other Ivy League institutions combined.” Id.

Vinay Harpalani - Diversity Within Racial Groups

24

Thus, universities are in the best position to determine the mix of students that constitutes
a “critical mass” of diverse perspectives.64 Even if “critical mass” could be conceptualized
solely in terms of numbers of minority students,65 a university cannot possibly admit a “critical
mass” of every group. There are too many different racial/ethnic groups with varying
experiences and perspectives, all of which could contribute to the educational benefits of
diversity. Moreover, enrollment of minority students may be limited by other factors, such as the
availability of financial aid.66 Given limited resources and the limited size of its admitted class, a
university must make its own judgments about which perspectives should be included and are
most central to its educational mission67--so long as any race conscious admissions policies it
employs adhere to Grutter’s guidelines. In fact, this is the reason for Grutter’s deference to
colleges and universities in the admissions process.68
Finally, in terms of minority students feeling “isolated or like spokespersons for their
race,”69 Justice Rehnquist failed to consider that members of one minority group may help
members of other minority groups feel less isolated. For example, if there are African American
and Latino students in a class who speak up and share their views, then a Native American
student may feel more emboldened to do so. In fact, minority student organizations regularly

64

See Fisher at 39 (“[T]here is no reason to assume that critical mass will or should be the same for every racial
group or university.”). Alternatively, a university might also decide that racial stereotypes of a specific group—for
example, African Americans—are particularly pervasive and pernicious on a broader level, and that the breakdown
of those stereotypes is central to its educational mission. Racial stereotypes are perpetuated by both local
circumstances and the national media, and there is no prescription for how to best break them down.
65
See supra notes 27-29 for a discussion of why “critical mass” cannot be defined numerically.
66
See Osamudia James, Dog Wags Tail: The Continuing Viability of Minority-Targeted Aid in Higher Education, 85
IND. L.J. 851, 853 (2010)(noting that “actually enrolling a critical mass of minority students … [is] … a goal that is
often unattainable without financial aid.”).
67
See supra notes 63-64.
68
See Grutter at 329-330 (“Our holding [in Grutter] is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference
to a university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits. … ‘good faith’ on the part of a
university is ‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing to the contrary.’”).
69
Id. at 319.
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collaborate on activities and interact and support one another at many institutions of higher
education.70
3. Can “Critical Mass” be Measured At All?
It is important to note that while Grutter allows “some attention to numbers,”71 this
Article argues that “critical mass” is not readily measurable in practice. As noted, attaining a
“critical mass” requires an admissions committee to look to other factors beyond race,72 so mere
numbers or percentages of minority students would not allow one to determine if a “critical
mass” is present. Based on the interaction of various demographic characteristics and life
experiences (including those involving race), Grutter envisioned that a given student may
express one or more perspectives or characteristics that add to the mix of ideas in an admitted
class.73 The student’s unique contribution in this milieu depends in part on the other perspectives
represented in the applicant pool; thus, it is not possible to accurately predict ex ante how many
students of a given group are necessary to meet the goals of attaining the educational benefits of
70

For example, since 1978, undergraduate student of color organizations at the University of Pennsylvania (where
the author attended graduate school) have formed an umbrella group called the United Minorities Coalition, which
sponsors events that promote unity among various minority groups. See http://www.dolphin.upenn.edu/umc/ White
students are also sometimes involved in these coalitions; for example, at Penn, there is a Black-Jewish student
coalition called Alliance and Understanding. See http://www.vpul.upenn.edu/gic/au.php
Additionally, at NYU School of Law, the various student of color organizations—the Black Allied Law
Students Association (BALSA), Latino Law Students Association (LLSA), Asian Pacific American Law Students
Association (APALSA), South Asian Law Students Association (SALSA), and the Multiracial Law Students
Association (MuLSA)—held an “All-ALSA” Symposium in 2008 entitled “Can People of Color Become a United
Coalition?” See Vinay Harpalani, Ambiguity, Ambivalence, and Awakening: A South Asian Becoming “Critically”
Aware of Race in America, 11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 71, 82 (2009). These organizations have also
formed an “All-ALSA” Coalition and regularly meet and collaborate on events. See, e.g., “All ALSA Coalition
Graduation and Reception,” “http://its.law.nyu.edu/eventcalendar/index.cfm?fuseaction=main.detail&id=18723.
Also, the Black, Latino, Asian Pacific Alumni Association (BLAPA) serves the same purpose for alumni of NYU
School of Law. See http://www.law.nyu.edu/alumni/alumniassociations/blapa/index.htm
71
Grutter at 336.
72
Id. at 337 (“[T]he Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving
serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.”).
73
Grutter at 309 (“The Law School's admissions program … is flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is
evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes race or ethnicity the defining feature of the application. …
The Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment. There is no policy,
either de jure or de facto, of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single “soft” variable. … [T]he program
adequately ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race.”).
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diversity. Moreover, these benefits may vary based on local history, demographics, and politics,
or the institution’s history and educational mission, all of which can also change over time.
Thus, “critical mass” may vary by institution and may vary over time with local and national
demographic changes. As noted, it may also be different for different racial groups.74
Because of these complexities, it would be difficult to devise a consistent judicial
standard to determine whether an institution has attained a “critical mass.”75 In theory, one
might devise an index of various types of diversity—socioeconomic, geographic, experiential,
political, etc.—and aim to measure diversity within racial groups, in addition to the numbers of
students from each racial group. In practice, however, this would be a difficult and subjective
enterprise for a court to undertake; it is best left to university admissions committees who can
assess these factors and local conditions more effectively. This is why Grutter entrusts colleges
and university admissions committees to employ “good faith” when using race as a factor in the
admissions process.76
Because “critical mass” cannot be readily measured, this Article argues that it is merely
part of the definition of Grutter’s compelling interest, not part of the narrow tailoring test for
race conscious admissions policies.77 This does not mean, however, that there is no room for

74

See supra Part I.C.2; Fisher v. Texas, 631 F.3d 213, 238 (5th Cir. 2011)(“The educational benefits recognized in
Grutter go beyond the narrow ‘pedagogical concept’ urged by Appellants. On this understanding, there is no reason
to assume that critical mass will or should be the same for every racial group or every university.”).
75
When Fisher was appealed to the Fifth Circuit, the amicus brief of the Mountain States Legal Foundation made a
similar claim. See Brief for Mountain States Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae at 14, Fisher v. Texas, 631 F.3d
213 (5th Cir. 2011)(“[B]ecause critical mass cannot be quantified, no court is able to determine whether a critical
mass is present or lacking.”). Available
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Amicus.Mountain.States.Legal.Foundation.pdf
76
Cf. Grutter at 309-10. (“The Court takes the Law School at its word that it would like nothing better than to find a
race-neutral admissions formula and will terminate its use of racial preferences as soon as practicable.”).
77
UT contended that the Fisher Plaintiffs framed “critical mass” as part of both the compelling interest and narrow
tailoring prongs of strict scrutiny. Appellees’ Br. at 43 (“Plaintiffs contend that UT’s revised admissions policy is
not narrowly tailored because … it was not needed for UT to enroll a critical mass of underrepresented
minorities. (At times, Plaintiffs refer to this as a “compelling interest” argument, and at other times they characterize
it as a “narrow tailoring” argument. But the argument is meritless regardless of nomenclature.).” The argument for
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more stringent judicial review of race conscious admissions policies in Fisher v. Texas, as Parts
IV and V infra will show.

II. Within-Group Diversity, Narrow Tailoring and Deference: Reducing Stigmatic Harm
Grutter stands in contrast with much of the Supreme Court’s recent race and affirmative
action jurisprudence. In the two decades preceding Grutter, the Court was much more apt to
strike down race conscious policies.78 Since 2003, the Court has narrowed the scope of Grutter
to higher education.79 The Court’s deviation in Grutter has largely been attributed to the unique
educational benefits of student diversity at colleges and universities.80
However, another factor that distinguished Grutter from other affirmative action cases
was the flexible, unquantified manner in which the University of Michigan Law School used
resolving Fisher posed by this Article is not contingent upon whether “critical mass” is considered part of the
compelling interest or narrow tailoring prong. See infra Parts IV and V.
78
Justice O’Connor herself had authored numerous opinions which invalidated race conscious policies under the
Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986)(O’Connor, J.,
concurring)(striking down “layoff provision” which preserved jobs of minority teachers with less seniority); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)(striking down City of Richmond’s minority set-aside program
for contracts); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993)(striking down North Carolina’s congressional redistricting
plan because “[r]acial classifications … pose the risk of lasting harm to our society … [because] … [t]hey reinforce
the belief … that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. … [r]acial gerrymandering, even for
remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions.”). Even in the few cases where the Court
upheld race conscious policies, Justice O’Connor had dissented. See U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)(upholding “one-black-for-one-white promotion requirement.”); Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)(upholding race conscious policies implemented by Federal
Communications Commission.).
79
See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 765 (2007)(striking
race conscious public school assignment plans in Seattle and Louisville and noting that in Grutter, the Court’s
“deference [in the use of race] was prompted by factors uniquely relevant to higher education.”).
80
See Kenneth L. Karst, The Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative Action, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 60, 60 (2004)
(noting that “in Grutter, the Court spelled out in some detail the potential educational advantages of student
diversity…thus…grounding in social science…the advantages Justice Powell had asserted [in Bakke] on the basis of
less evidence.”). Professor also Karst highlighted the role of three amicus briefs—one from military leaders,
another from business leaders, and a third from organized labor—in facilitating the Court’s acceptance of diversity
in education as a compelling state interest. Id. at at 66-69. See also Marcia G. Synnott, The Evolving Diversity
Rationale in University Admissions: From Regents v. Bakke to the University Of Michigan Cases, 90 Cornell L.
Rev. 463, 493 (2005)(“Justice O'Connor's majority opinion recognized that race may also be used in an inclusive
way to achieve diversity that is beneficial to white and minority students alike.”); Colin S. Diver, From Equality to
Diversity: The Detour from Brown to Grutter, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 691, 699 (2004) (“In her opinion for the Grutter
majority, Justice O'Connor variably characterizes the state's interests as: ‘obtaining 'the educational benefits that
flow from a diverse student body’'; ‘attaining a diverse student body’; and ‘assembling a class that is both
exceptionally academically qualified and broadly diverse.’”).
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race—in the context of its holistic admissions policy. Justice O’Connor’s Grutter opinion laid
out several criteria for narrowly tailored, race conscious, holistic admissions policies:
individualized consideration of all applicants, flexible, non-mechanical use of race, no insulation
from competition based on race, no undue harm or burden to non-minority applicants, and
“sunset” provisions to eventually end race conscious policies.81 While many commentators have
criticized its treatment of narrow tailoring as a deviation from the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence,82 this Part explains Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles in terms of minimizing
the stigmatic harm of race conscious admissions policies—a goal that is consistent with the
Court’s recent race jurisprudence. Additionally, this Part illustrates how Grutter’s narrow
tailoring principles are related to the “critical mass” concept and particularly to diversity within
racial groups—thus providing internal logic and coherence to the much maligned Grutter
majority opinion.83
A. Overview of Stigmatic Harm
To explain Grutter’s theory of narrow tailoring, it is first necessary to define “stigmatic
harm.” In the Supreme Court’s recent race jurisprudence, stigmatic harm can be understood as
the harm that occurs when a government policy reinforces racial stereotypes. For example,
Justice O’Connor, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., describes this harm:
Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm … they may in fact
promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility …
reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve

81

Grutter at 334, 341-42 (describing the features of a narrowly tailored race conscious admissions policy).
See, e.g., Ian Ayres and Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX.
LAW REV. 517 (2007)(arguing that Grutter deviates from the traditional “least restrictive means” test of narrow
tailoring); David Crump, The Narrow Tailoring Issue in the Affirmative Action Cases: Reconsidering the Supreme
Court's Approval in Gratz and Grutter of Race-Based Decision-Making by Individualized Discretion, 56 FLA. L.
REV. 483, 538 (2004)(arguing that in Gratz and Grutter, “the Court performed poorly in defining narrow tailoring.
The majority spent most of its effort explaining what narrow tailoring is not, and little in defining what it is.”).
83
See supra note 11.
82
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success without special protection based on a factor having no relation to
individual worth84
The harm espoused here is a constitutional harm, not a tangible or psychological one.85 Some
commentators have embraced the view that race conscious policies directly stigmatize and inflict
psychological harms upon minorities, and this is a debated issue.86 However, the presence or
absence of any such psychological harms or other tangible effects is not the relevant issue. The
Court’s recent race jurisprudence describes constitutional stigmatic harm as that which occurs
when government action itself reinforces racial stereotypes; the tangible results of such action
are not relevant to the constitutional analysis. As Justice O’Connor noted in her dissenting
opinion in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
Social scientists may debate how peoples' thoughts and behavior reflect their
background, but the Constitution provides that the Government may not allocate
84

488 U.S. at 494.
This notion of stigmatic harm is very similar to the definition of “expressive harm” articulated by Professors
Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi:
85

An expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed through a governmental action,
rather than from the more tangible or material consequences the action brings about. On this view, the
meaning of a governmental action is just as important as what that action does. Public policies can violate
the Constitution not only because they bring about concrete costs, but because the very meaning they
convey demonstrates inappropriate respect for relevant public values.
Richard Pildes & Richard Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating ElectionDistrict Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 507-8 (1993). Professors Pildes and Niemi
further note that the “harm is not concrete to particular individuals,” but rather “lies in the disruption to
constitutionally underwritten public understandings about the appropriate structure of values.” Id. at 507.
86
See, e.g., Clegg, supra note 11 at 435 (contending that race conscious admissions policies “stigmatize the socalled beneficiaries in the eyes of their classmates, teachers, and themselves …”); Richard H. Sander, The Racial
Paradox of the Corporate Law, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1755, 1812 (2006) (arguing that partners in law firms “have low
expectations of black associates”); Grutter at 373 (Thomas, J., dissenting)(“[T]he majority of blacks are admitted to
the Law School because of discrimination, and because of this policy all are tarred as undeserving. This problem of
stigma does not depend on determinacy as to whether those stigmatized are actually the ‘beneficiaries’ of racial
discrimination. When blacks take positions in the highest places of government, industry, or academia, it is an open
question today whether their skin color played a part in their advancement. The question itself is the stigma-because
either racial discrimination did play a role, in which case the person may be deemed ‘otherwise unqualified,’ or it
did not, in which case asking the question itself unfairly marks those blacks who would succeed without
discrimination.”). Joshua Levine, Comment, Stigma's Opening: Grutter's Diversity Interest(s) and the New
Calculus for Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 457, 487 (2006)(referring to Justice Clarence
Thomas as “a black person who has felt stigmatic harm from others questioning his competency and pressuring him
to conform to racial stereotypes.”). But see Angela Onwauchi-Willig, Emily Houh, & Mary Campbell, Cracking the
Egg: Which Came First--Stigma or Affirmative Action?, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1346 (2008) (arguing that
“affirmative action policies do not in fact ‘harm’ students of color in the way that opponents of affirmative action
have claimed.”).
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benefits and burdens among individuals based on the assumption that race or
ethnicity determines how they act or think.87
Thus, stigmatic harm as conceptualized in the Court’s jurisprudence occurs when a government
policy treats individuals in the same manner based on racial group membership, regardless of the
negative or positive consequences for minorities (or for non-minorities).88
B. Grutter’s Theory of Narrow Tailoring
Having defined stigmatic harm, this Part now illustrates how Grutter’s narrow tailoring
principles aim to minimize the stigmatic harm of its race conscious policies.
1. The Gratz/Grutter Distinction
At the same time it upheld the Law School’s admissions policy in Grutter, the Court
struck down the University of Michigan’s race conscious admissions policy for the College of
Letters, Sciences, and Arts (LSA) in Gratz v. Bollinger.89 The Gratz plan relied on a fixed
weight point system rather than a flexible, holistic admissions process; LSA’s admissions policy
automatically awarded 20 points on a 150 point scale to applicants from underrepresented
minority groups,90 a measure the Court found to be too rigid and mechanical—failing to “provide
… individualized consideration.”91

87

Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Also, in Shaw v. Reno,
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion noted that “an explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to stimulate our
society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally
bears no relationship to an individual's worth or needs.” 509 U.S. 630, 643. Professors Pildes and Niemi argue that
Shaw is rooted in the notion that “the state has impermissibly endorsed too dominant a role for race,” and that the
decision “might rest on the intrinsic ground that the endorsement is wrong, in and of itself,” or “on the instrumental
ground that this state endorsement threatens to reshape social perceptions along similar lines.” Pildes and Niemi,
supra n., at 509.
88
For an alternative view of racial stigmatic harms, see Robin A. Leinhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race,
Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 803 (2004)(arguing “that stigmatic harm occurs when a
given act or policy sends the message that racial difference renders a person or a group inferior to Whites, the
category constructed as the racial norm.”). This Article does not question the validity of Professor Leinhardt’s
proposition; it merely contends that the Supreme Court has a different view of stigmatic harm, as apparent in its race
jurisprudence, including Grutter. See supra Part II.A.
89
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
90
Id. at 255.
91
Id. at 271.
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Various scholars have critiqued the Court’s distinction between Gratz and Grutter.92
Professor Cass Sunstein contends that:
[I]n the context of affirmative action, Justice O'Connor's … judgment has led her
to a puzzling and probably indefensible conclusion. It is hardly clear that the
Constitution should be taken to require a procedure that sacrifices transparency,
predictability, and equal treatment—and that does so while imposing significant
burdens on officials who must evaluate particular applications for admission.93
Professor Sunstein attributes Justice O’Connor’s Grutter decision to her general “holistic
practice,”94 shown through judicial minimalism and a “preference for case-by-case judgment.”95
Professor Heather Gerkin espouses a different view, emphasizing stealth as value embraced in
the Grutter approach to race conscious admissions.96
While these are valid perspectives, another explanation for the Gratz-Grutter distinction
can be found in the Court’s attempt to minimize the stigmatic harm of race preferences.97 In
Gratz, the majority noted that the “LSA policy does not provide … individualized consideration
… [because it] … automatically distributes 20 points to every single applicant from an
92

See, e.g., Ayres & Foster, supra note 82; Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1899,
1902 (2006); David Crump, The Narrow Tailoring Issue in the Affirmative Action Cases: Reconsidering the
Supreme Court's Approval in Gratz and Grutter of Race-Based Decision-Making by Individualized Discretion, 56
Fla. L. Rev. 483, 528-29 (2004)(“ One can argue that the undergraduate Michigan program at issue in Gratz,
involving a fixed-point system, should have been regarded as constitutionally superior to the unlimited discretion
model in Grutter. … At least in such a system the invidious exercise of discretion has been structured, confined,
and checked. … The point system used in the undergraduate program struck down in Gratz should instead have been
preferred because it makes the racial remedy visible … [.]”).
93
Sunstein, supra note 92, at 1902.
94
Id. at 1901.
95
Id.
96
See Gerkin, supra note 6, at 104 (characterizing Justices Powell and O'Connor’s views as “something akin to a
‘don't ask, don't tell’ approach to race-conscious decisionmaking: use race, but don't be obvious about it.”).(internal
citation omitted).
97
See Michelle Adams, Searching for Strict Scrutiny in Grutter v. Bollinger, 78 Tul. L. Rev. 1941, 1953
(2004)(arguing that in Grutter, “the Court was more concerned with how the Law School's application process
actually appeared and the message that it sent to the public than with its impact on any particular white applicant. In
this way, Justice O'Connor's acceptance of the Law School's application process in Grutter is consistent with her
rejection of the bizarrely shaped electoral districts in Shaw v. Reno. … In Grutter, as in Shaw, the message
communicated by the governmental action was paramount.”). Joshua Levine also notes that Grutter’s narrow
tailoring principles may reduce stigmatic harm. See Levine, supra note 86, at 520 (“[I]f race truly is ‘one of many’
factors and acts only as a small ‘plus’--such that the applicant and others can never really know whether race played
a role in one's admission, then it is possible the stigmatic harm would be reduced.”). However, Levine’s definition
of “stigmatic harm” is broader than one posed in this Article, as it encompasses tangible harm to minority
applicants. See supra Part II.B.
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‘underrepresented minority’ group, as defined by the University.”98 In contrast to the LSA
policy struck down in Gratz, the Law School admissions policy upheld in Grutter did not use a
point system; rather, it considered race subjectively as one element of a holistic admissions
process.99 Minority applicants did not all receive the same benefit and race was considered along
with other factors to determine its place in the overall evaluation.100 Grutter’s requirements for a
narrowly tailored, holistic admissions program—individualized review, flexible use of race,
consideration of factors other than race, preference for race neutral alternatives, and “sunset”
provisions to gradually phase out race conscious policies—all reflect a principle of minimizing
stigmatic harm. Grutter held that “truly individualized consideration demands that race be used
in a flexible, nonmechanical way.”101 The decision contemplates that race will be considered as a
“plus” factor only in the context of a given applicant’s other characteristics,102 and individualized
review of all applicants is required to determine if and how race should serve as a “plus
factor.”103 These provisions serve to minimize stigmatic harm by ensuring that beyond the
holistic, individually variable consideration of race, minority students are not treated differently
than non-minority students.104 Grutter also requires colleges and universities to undertake “good
98

Gratz at 271.
Grutter at 337(“[T]he Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file,
giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment …
[u]nlike the program at issue in Gratz v. Bollinger … the Law School awards no mechanical, predetermined
diversity ‘bonuses’ based on race or ethnicity.”).
100
Grutter at 336-37. (“When using race as a “plus” factor in university admissions, a university's admissions
program must remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way
that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application. The importance of this
individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is paramount. See Bakke, 438
U.S., at 318, n. 52, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.) (identifying the “denial ... of th[e] right to individualized
consideration” as the “principal evil” of the medical school's admissions program).”).
101
Grutter at 337.
102
Id. at 337. (“[T]he Law School's race-conscious admissions program adequately ensures that all factors that may
contribute to student body diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race in admissions decisions.”).
103
Id. at 334. (“Universities can … consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a “plus” factor in the context of
individualized consideration of each and every applicant.”).
104
Cf. Paul Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of
Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 928 (1983)(“The indirectness of the less explicitly numerical systems
may have significant advantages, not so much in terms of the processes of consideration as in the felt impact of their
99
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faith” consideration of race neutral alternatives to the race conscious admissions policy, 105 and to
periodically review the policy to determine if it is still necessary.106 Here, Grutter recognized
that any preferential treatment based on race creates stigmatic harm and should be phased out
eventually.107
In these ways, Grutter’s mandate that “the importance of individualized consideration in
the context of a race-conscious admissions program is paramount”108 was consistent with the
view in Croson and Shaw that “individual worth” should predominate over race.109 While the
cases differ in that the former upheld a race conscious policy and the latter two did not, all of
them reflect a broader principle of avoiding or minimizing stigmatic harm.
Scholarly analysis has generally not examined this aspect of Grutter110—probably
because Grutter did not strike down a race conscious policy, and because some commentators
view Grutter’s narrow tailoring provisions as a smokescreen that merely hides racial quotas and
race balancing,111 or at least serves mainly to hide the use of race rather than to insure that race is

operation over time. The description of race as simply ‘another factor’ among a lot of others considered in seeking
diversity tends to minimize the sense that minority students are separate and different and the recipients of special
dispensations; the use of more explicitly separate and structured systems might have the opposite effect.”).
Professor Mishkin focused here on advantages of the perception that race is used in a flexible, individualized
manner. In contrast, this Article focuses on advantages of actually using race in such a manner.
105
Grutter at 339 (“Narrow tailoring does … require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks.”).
106
Id. at 342 (“In the context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met by sunset provisions in
race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary
to achieve student body diversity.”).
107
Id.
108
Id. at 227.
109
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
110
Two exceptions are Professor Michelle Adams and Joshua Levine, supra note 97.
111
See, e.g., Graglia, supra note 25, at 2048 (2004). In his Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy also expresses a similar
view. See Grutter at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“[T]he Law School … attempt[s] to make race an automatic
factor in most instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.”). This Article only aims to
articulate the theory underlying Grutter and to apply this theory to Fisher v. Texas. The Article takes no position on
whether the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policy actually adhered to this theory based on the
facts in Grutter.
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actually used in a flexible, individualized manner.112 Part IV will discuss how courts can review
race conscious policies more stringently under Grutter.
2. Least Restrictive Means as the “Least Stigmatic Means”
Professors Ian Ayres and Sydney Foster provide another critique of Grutter’s narrow
tailoring requirements. They argue that the Grutter ruling deviated from prior constitutional
doctrine requiring government use of suspect classifications to employ the “least restrictive
means.”113 In their view, narrow tailoring of race conscious admissions policies should require
the “minimum necessary preference” to achieve sufficient diversity.114 Part V infra will discuss
these issues further.
Professor Ayres and Foster also contend that the Grutter admissions plan gave more
weight to race than the plan struck down in Gratz,115 and thus did not employ the “minimum
necessary preference.”116 Assuming that Professor Ayres and Foster are correct in their
assessment of weight given to race, one can posit that under Grutter, stigmatic harm is not
determined solely by the weight of race preferences (although that is a factor),117 but also by the

112

See supra notes 96 and 104, and accompanying text.
Ayres and Foster, supra note 82, at 523 n.28 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that state action which employs
“'suspect classifications' is to be subjected to 'strict scrutiny' and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling
government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available.”). Ayres and Foster conced
that “[s]ome older cases include language suggesting that strict scrutiny does not demand use of the least restrictive
means[,]” but they contend that “[i]n light of more recent cases demanding consideration of race-neutral alternatives
and applying a stricter version of strict scrutiny, however, these cases are no longer good law with respect to this
point.” Id. Nevertheless, for a different view of narrow tailoring, see Jeb Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 Yale
L.J. 427, 438 (1997)(noting that strict scrutiny in recent equal protection jurisprudence can be viewed as “a costbenefit justificatory test … [which] … serve[s] to determine whether a law that causes acknowledged constitutional
harms is justified by sufficiently important benefits that a less constitutionally costly … law could not have
achieved.”).
114
Id. at 521.
115
Ayres and Foster, supra note 82 at 534(concluding that “the Law School gave more weight to race than the
College.”). See also infra Part V.B.2 (discussing weight given to race in admissions as an limiting principle for race
conscious admissions policies).
116
See id.
117
This Article builds on Professors Pildes and Niemi’s analysis by arguing that the stigmatic harm associated with
government use of race accrues not only when race has too dominant a role, but also when it is used in a manner that
promotes stereotyping by treating all of individuals of the same race in exactly the same way (e.g., by using a
113
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manner in which those preferences are applied. A flexible, holistic admissions process with
individualized review creates less stigmatic harm than a fixed, weight point system, even if the
latter gives less overall weight to race, because flexibility and individualized review ensure—to
the greatest extent possible—that all applicants from a given group will not be treated exactly the
same merely because of their race.118 Professor Ayres and Foster do acknowledge that narrow
tailoring inquiry can vary by context,119 and in this context, the Grutter majority created a least
stigmatic means principle—a standard that defines narrow tailoring in terms of minimizing the
stigmatic harm of race conscious admissions policies.120
C. Within-Group Diversity and Grutter’s Internal Logic
“Critical mass” and Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles are essentially two sides of the
same coin, and considering them together shows the internal logic and coherence of the Grutter
opinion. A “critical mass” of minority students, which includes sufficient diversity of
viewpoints and experiences within each racial group, facilitates the educational benefits of
diversity that Grutter held as a compelling interest: breaking down racial stereotypes and
promoting cross-racial understanding and dialogue.121 Grutter recognized that these benefits are
tangible and important, and that race conscious admissions policies are necessary to attain them.
At the same time, however, Grutter recognized the stigmatic harm of using race
conscious admissions policies and how they could reinforce the very stereotypes that a “critical
mechanical point system such as the one struck down in Gratz). Grutter essentially prioritizes the latter concern
over the former.
118
As noted earlier, some commentators, including Justice Kennedy, claim that Grutter’s narrow tailoring
principles allow universities to hide their use of quotas and point systems under the guise of holistic admissions.
See supra notes 25 and 111 and accompanying text. To the extent this is true, courts must be more vigilant in
enforcing Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles, and emphasizing within-group diversity aids in this process. See
infra Parts II.C. and IV.
119
Ayres and Foster, supra note 82, at 577 (“[T]he narrow tailoring inquiry has always had multiple dimensions.”).
See also Grutter at 333-34 (“[T]he contours of the narrow-tailoring inquiry with respect to race-conscious university
admissions programs … must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by the use of race to achieve student body
diversity in public higher education.”). Ayers and Foster themselves acknowledge that
120
Part IV.C.2., infra, reconciles the least restrictive means and least stigmatic means theories of narrow tailoring.
121
Grutter at 330.
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mass” of viewpoints and experiences was intended to break down. Thus, Grutter’s narrow
tailoring principles aim to reduce stereotyping within the admissions process, by minimizing
stigmatic harm and requiring that applicants be reviewed on an individual basis. This is why
Grutter mandates that race be used in a flexible, rather than a mechanical, manner. Even though
race conscious policies can be employed, it is paramount that they not treat all applicants of the
same racial group in exactly the same manner.122 Grutter’s other narrow tailoring requirements,
including its “sunset” requirement,123 also aim to reduce and eventually eliminate stigmatic
harm.
When viewed together, “critical mass” and the least stigmatic means principle of narrow
tailoring represent Grutter’s balance between the educational benefits of diversity and the
stigmatic harm of race conscious policies.124 In fact, if properly implemented, Grutter’s narrow
tailoring provisions inherently facilitate the admission of a “critical mass” of perspectives and
experiences within racial groups. Unlike a racial quota, numerical goal/range, or a Gratz-type
point system, a “critical mass” cannot be attained merely by identifying an applicant’s race and
mechanically using this information. A holistic admissions process—which includes
individualized review, considers race in a flexible manner, and uses diversity factors other than
race—is necessary to yield a “critical mass” that includes diversity within racial groups. By
definition, achieving such within-group diversity reduces stigmatic harm, because it requires
admissions committees to consider factors besides race and to treat applicants of the same race
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See supra Part II.B.
Grutter at 342 (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. … [i]n the context of higher
education, the durational requirement can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and
periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”).
124
See Adams, supra note 97 at 1953 (noting that “the balancing performed by Justice O'Connor in the Grutter case
is as an example of cost-benefit balancing between societal harms and societal benefits.”); Rubenfeld, supra note
113, at 438 (noting that strict scrutiny in recent equal protection jurisprudence can be viewed as “a cost-benefit
justificatory test … [which] … serve[s] to determine whether a law that causes acknowledged constitutional harms
is justified by sufficiently important benefits that a less constitutionally costly … law could not have achieved.”).
123
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differently based on non-racial factors.125 These were precisely the concerns expressed in Justice
Kennedy’s Grutter dissent.126
D. Standards of Review in Grutter: The Need for Deference to Universities
Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter also contends that the Grutter majority abandoned
strict scrutiny127 and critiques the majority for its deference to the Law School.128 The Grutter
opinion does delineate multiple standards of review, deferring to universities’ “good faith” that
racial diversity is necessary to attain educational benefits, while still applying strict scrutiny (the
“least stigmatic means”) to evaluate the manner in which race is used (or at least claiming to do
so).129 The “good faith” standard with respect to the educational benefits of diversity is a natural
consequence of the analysis presented earlier: because “critical mass” is a complex entity and
125

Grutter at 309 (“The Law School's admissions program … is flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is
evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes race or ethnicity the defining feature of the application. …
The Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment. There is no policy,
either de jure or de facto, of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single “soft” variable. … Also, the
program adequately ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside
race.”). See also Gratz at 271 (noting that “Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke emphasized the importance of
considering each particular applicant as an individual, assessing all of the qualities that individual possesses, and in
turn, evaluating that individual's ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher education.”).
For an example of how the Supreme Court envisioned this would work, see Gratz at 272-73 (“[I]nstructive
in our consideration … is the example … which Justice Powell both discussed in, and attached to, his opinion in
Bakke. The example was included to “illustrate the kind of significance attached to race” … It provided as follows:
“The Admissions Committee, with only a few places left to fill, might find itself forced to choose between
A, the child of a successful black physician in an academic community with promise of superior academic
performance, and B, a black who grew up in an inner-city ghetto of semi-literate parents whose academic
achievement was lower but who had demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an apparently abiding
interest in black power. If a good number of black students much like A but few like B had already been
admitted, the Committee might prefer B; and vice versa. If C, a white student with extraordinary artistic
talent, were also seeking one of the remaining places, his unique quality might give him an edge over both
A and B. Thus, the critical criteria are often individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race but
sometimes associated with it.”
126
Grutter at 392-93(Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as
one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity …”). Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter stemmed
from his belief, based on the facts, that the University of Michigan School of Law did use race as a predominant
factor. Id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(noting that at the University of Michigan School of Law, “race is likely
outcome determinative for many members of minority groups.”). He further noted that “an educational institution
must ensure, through sufficient procedures, that each applicant receives individual consideration and that race does
not become a predominant factor in the admissions decisionmaking.” Id. at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
127
Id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(contending that “[t]he Court … does not apply strict scrutiny” in Grutter.).
128
Id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“ Deference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent with it.”).
129
Id. at 326 (noting that the Court has “held that all racial classifications imposed by government ‘must be analyzed
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’”). But see supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
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cannot be measured accurately by courts, universities are in the best position to determine the
level and type of diversity needed to fulfill their educational missions. Grutter also cites the
Supreme Court’s “tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions,
within constitutionally prescribed limits[,]”130 particularly with respect to “complex educational
judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university.”131 Thus, both
pragmatic and doctrinal reasons exist for deferring to universities’ judgment on the educational
benefits of diversity.
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent takes strong issue with such deference,
critiquing the majority for being “satisfied by the Law School's profession of its own good
faith.”132 This aspect of Grutter is likely to be modified or overturned when the Supreme Court
decides Fisher. Part IV of this Article proposes a more nuanced, alternative interpretation of
Grutter’s deference and judicial review provisions—one that addresses Justice Kennedy’s
concerns as applied to Fisher.
In sum, this Part has illustrate how “critical mass” and Grutter’s least stigmatic means
theory of narrow tailoring encompass diversity within groups. Within-group diversity is relevant
to the constitutionality of race conscious admissions for several reasons: 1. Distinguishing
“critical mass” from racial quotas and numerical goals; 2. Attaining the educational benefits of
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Id. at 328.
Id. See also id. at 329 (“We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of public education
and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a
special niche in our constitutional tradition. … In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a
compelling state interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded in the
First Amendment, of educational autonomy: ‘The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to
education includes the selection of its student body.’ Bakke, supra, at 312 … From this premise, Justice Powell
reasoned that by claiming ‘the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the “robust
exchange of ideas,”’ a university ‘seek[s] to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its
mission.’”); Bakke at 319 (Powell, J., concurring)(“ Universities … may make individualized decisions, in which
ethnic background plays a part, under a presumption of legality and legitimate educational purpose. So long as the
university proceeds on an individualized, case-by-case basis, there is no warrant for judicial interference in the
academic process.”).
132
Grutter at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
131
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diversity articulated in Grutter; and 3. Reducing the stigmatic harm of race conscious policies;
and 4. Clarifying the need for courts’ deference to universities with respect to admissions
policies Moreover, as the analysis of Fisher in the subsequent Parts will illustrate, race
conscious admissions policies may be used not only to increase numbers of minority students,
but also specifically to target particular subgroups of minority students, in order to increase
diversity within racial groups.

III. Fisher v. Texas, “Critical Mass,” and Deference to Universities
Part II illustrated the internal logic and theoretical coherence of Grutter’s various
components. This Part discusses the application of “critical mass” in Fisher v. Texas and the
Fifth Circuit panel’s deference to UT in determining whether it had enrolled a “critical mass.” It
then presents a critique of the Fifth Circuit’s Fisher opinion on these bases, setting the stage for
the proposed alternative method to decide Fisher.
A. Overview
Fisher v. Texas133 is the Supreme Court’s first opportunity to clarify Grutter’s “critical
mass” concept.134 In order to understand Fisher, it is necessary to briefly review the University
of Texas’s changing undergraduate admissions policy and provide historical context for the
case.135
133

631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011)(upholding the University of Texas at Austin’s race conscious undergraduate
admissions policy).
134
In Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), the Court did consider and strike down race conscious assignment
plans for public schools, but the definition of “critical mass” was not a factor in the Court’s decision. In fact, the
Court distinguished these assignment plans from the holistic admissions policy upheld in Grutter. Id. at 704-5 (“In
Grutter, the number of minority students the school sought to admit was an undefined ‘meaningful number’
necessary to achieve a genuinely diverse student body … and the Court concluded that the law school did not count
back from its applicant pool to arrive at that number [.] … Here, in contrast, the schools worked backward to
achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level
of diversity that provides the purported benefits. This is a fatal flaw under the Court's existing precedent.”).
135
Id. at 222-31 (5th Cir. 2011) (describing the history of changes in the University of Texas at Austin undergraduate
admissions policy).
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1. Hopwood v. Texas and the Top Ten Percent Law
Prior to the Fifth Circuit’s 1996 decision in Hopwood v. Texas,136 the University of Texas
(UT) used a variety of race conscious admissions procedures, and in Fall 1993, these resulted in
an entering freshman class that was 4.5% African American and 15.6% Latina/o.137 In 1996,
Hopwood outlawed the use of race conscious policies in the Fifth Circuit (Texas, Louisiana, and
Mississippi), and as a result, for Fall 1997, the African American enrollment in the incoming
class dropped to 2.7% and the Latina/o enrollment dropped to 12.6%.138 In response, the Texas
legislature passed the Top Ten Percent Law,139 which guaranteed admission to any Texas state
university to Texas public high school seniors in the top ten percent of their class.140 This law
was intended to increase minority representation without directly using race as part of the
admissions process.141 By 2004, partly as a result of the Top Ten Percent Law, the percentage of
African Americans in the incoming class had increased to 4.5% and the percentage of Latina/os
increased to 16.9%.142
2. Post-Grutter Return of Race Conscious Admissions
With the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Grutter, Hopwood was overturned, and race
conscious admissions policies, in accordance with Grutter’s principles, were once again
permissible in Texas to enroll a “critical mass” of underrepresented minority students. UT
conducted a series of studies to determine whether it was enrolling a “critical mass” and
concluded that it was not. One study found that of classes with 10 to 24 students at UT, 89% had

136

78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
Fisher at 223.
138
Id. at 224.
139
Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803. In 2011, the Top Ten Percent Law was amended “to cap the number of students
guaranteed admission at UT Austin to 75% of the seats available to Texas residents.” Fisher at 224 n.56.
140
Fisher at 224.
141
Id. (“The Top Ten Percent Law did not by its terms admit students on the basis of race, but underrepresented
minorities were its announced target and their admission a large, if not primary, purpose.”).
142
Id. Part of his increase may have been due to demographic changes in the state of Texas. Id. at 226.
137
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0-1 African American students, 41% had 0-1 Asian American students, and 37% had 0-1
Latina/o students. Another study which surveyed undergraduate students found that a majority
felt that there was “insufficient minority representation” for the “full benefits of diversity to
occur,”143 and that minority students reported feeling isolated.144
In response, the UT created a new, multifaceted admissions policy which significantly
increased the enrollment of African American and Latina/o students, and also of Asian American
students in the next few years.145 The vast majority of African American and Latina/o students
were admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law, which was still in effect, as were over 80% of
total admitted students to the University of Texas.146 The rest of the class was admitted on the
basis of two measures: 1. Academic Index – a formula that predicts first year GPA based on high
school class rank and standardized test scores;147 and 2. Personal Achievement Index (PAI) –
based on holistic evaluation of an applicant’s entire file, including essays and a personal
achievement score which factors in extracurricular activities, family and socioeconomic
background, academic achievement as related to these variables, and race.148
The PAI is a numerical score based on ratings by admissions staff members, but
consistent with the Gratz/Grutter framework, it does not attach a specific weight to race in the
application process.149 The PAI was the only “race conscious” element of the new UT
admissions plan.
143

Id. at 225.
Id.
145
Id. at 226. it is possible that some of these increases were due in part to demographic changes in the state of
Texas. Id.
146
Id. at 229. In 2011, the Top Ten Percent Law was amended “to cap the number of students guaranteed admission
at UT Austin to 75% of the seats available to Texas residents.” Id. at 224 n.56.
147
Id. at 222.
148
Id. at 227-28.
149
Id. at 228. Also noteworthy is the fact that any applicant, of any race, could benefit from UT’s race conscious
admissions policy:
race can enhance the personal achievement score of a student from any racial background, including whites
and Asian-Americans. For example, a white student who has demonstrated substantial community
144
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3. Plaintiffs’ Claim
Plaintiffs150 Abigail Fisher and Rachel Michalewicz were both denied admission to the
University of Texas for the entering class of Fall 2008 and filed suit, alleging that UT’s race
conscious admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, the Plaintiffs
claimed that the race conscious aspects of the UT admissions policy was unwarranted because a
“race neutral” policy, the Top Ten Percent Law, had already yielded a “critical mass” of Black
and Latina/o students without the additional race conscious measure (the Personal Achievement
Index).151 Thus, the issue in Fisher is different than that in Bakke,152 Hopwood,153 Gratz,154 and
Grutter.155 All of those earlier cases were brought by Plaintiffs who claimed that their grades
and standardized test scores would have almost certainly garnered them admission if they had
been a member of a designated racial/ethnic group (usually Black or Latina/o). The Plaintiffs in
Fisher, in contrast, did not argue that UT would have admitted them but for the race conscious
policy.156 Rather, they contended that UT had achieved sufficient diversity—a “critical mass” of

involvement at a predominantly Hispanic high school may contribute a unique perspective that produces a
greater personal achievement score than a similarly situated Hispanic student from the same school. This
possibility is the point of Grutter's holistic and individualized assessments, which must be " 'flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each
applicant.' Indeed, just as in Grutter, UT applicants of every race may submit supplemental information to
highlight their potential diversity contributions, which allows students who are diverse in unconventional
ways to describe their unique attributes. Id. at 236.
150
This Article will refer to the parties who brought Fisher as the “Plaintiffs,” although the Fisher opinion
sometimes refers to them as “Appellants” or “Plaintiff-Appellants.” For purposes of this Article, these terms are
interchangeable.
151
631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011).
152
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
153
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
154
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
155
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
156
See Brown-Nagin, supra note 7, at 115 (“Fisher does not claim that racial consideration … necessarily doomed
her prospects. No evidence supports that position. The record shows that a total of 216 black and Latino applicants
gained acceptance to UT through holistic review in 2008, when Fisher unsuccessfully applied to UT. The plaintiff
concedes that race played no role in the admission of 183 of those 216 students … [t]he record is inconclusive on
whether [the remaining] thirty-three black and Latino students benefitted from race.”).
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underrepresented minority students—through its race neutral Top Ten Percent Law.157
Consequently, given Grutter’s preference for race neutral alternatives, the Plaintiffs argued that
UT could not use a race conscious admissions plan.158
4. Fifth Circuit Ruling in Fisher
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, in a ruling by Judge Sam
Sparks, rejected the Plaintiffs’ arguments and granted summary judgment to UT.159 A three
judge panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling and elaborated upon several of the issues
presented. The Fifth Circuit majority opinion in Fisher, by Judge Patrick Higginbotham, framed
Grutter as “holding that diversity, including seeking a critical mass of minority students, is ‘a
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.’”160 The Fifth
Circuit panel rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument that UT’s admissions policy amounts to racial
balancing because it focuses on demographically underrepresented groups.161 The panel noted
that demographics were only considered in assessing the initial need for a race conscious policy,
not during the actual admissions process.162 Applying a “good faith” standard,163 the panel also
deferred to UT’s judgment that race conscious policies were still necessary to attain a “critical
mass” and actualize the educational benefits of diversity. Judge Higginbotham’s opinion, along
with the concurrence by Judge Emilio Garza, both found that UT’s admissions policy was
consistent with Grutter, although in dicta, Judge Garza expounded upon his disdain for
157

Fisher at 234 (noting that Plaintiffs “question whether UT needs a Grutter-like policy… [because] … UT's
minority enrollment under the Top Ten Percent Law already surpassed critical mass … .”).
158
See id. (“[Plaintiffs] do not allege that UT's race-conscious admissions policy is functionally different from, or
gives greater consideration to race than, the policy upheld in Grutter. Rather, [Plaintiffs] question whether UT
needs a Grutter-like policy.”).
159
556 F.Supp.2d 603 (W.D.Tex. 2008).
160
Fisher at 219.
161
Id. at 235-36.
162
Id. at 236.
163
Id. at 233 (“[S]o long as a university considers race in a holistic and individualized manner, and not as part of a
quota or fixed-point system, courts must afford a measure of deference to the university's good faith determination
that certain race-conscious measures are necessary to achieve the educational benefits of diversity, including
attaining critical mass in minority enrollment.”).

Vinay Harpalani - Diversity Within Racial Groups

44

Grutter.164 Also in dicta, Judge Higginbotham was very critical of the Top Ten Percent Law,
stating that it excluded well qualified minority students who attended more competitive high
schools, and that it threatened to make UT’s race conscious policies unnecessary and
unconstitutional.165
In June 2011, by a narrow vote of 9 to 7, the Fifth Circuit denied the Plaintiffs request for
a rehearing of Fisher en banc.166 Chief Judge Edith Jones authored a dissenting opinion, joined
by four other judges.167 Chief Judge Jones’s critiques of Judge Higginbotham’s Fisher opinion
were threefold. First, Chief Judge Jones contended that Fisher essentially abrogates strict
scrutiny by replacing Grutter’s narrow tailoring inquiry with a “good faith” standard.168
Additionally, Judge Jones’s dissent found that the minimal impact of UT’s race conscious
policy—the fact that over 80 percent of students are admitted through the race neutral Top Ten
Percent plan—calls into question whether the race conscious policy is necessary to attain the
educational benefits of diversity.169 Finally, Chief Judge Jones contended that the application of
“critical mass” at the classroom level “offers no stopping point for racial preferences.”170 Under

164

Id. at 247(Garza, J., specially concurring)(stating that “Grutter represents a digression in the course of
constitutional law.”).
165
See infra Part III.B.3.
166
Fisher v. Texas, 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011)(en banc denied).
167
Id. at 303 (Jones, C.J., dissenting).
168
Chief Judge Jones contended that the court “may presume a university's good faith in the decision that it has a
compelling interest in achieving racial and other student diversity. But that is as about as far as deference should
go.” Id. at 305 n.3.
169
For a counterargument to Chief Judge Jones’s contention here, see infra Part V.C.2 (arguing that a race conscious
admissions policy could be useful in attaining within-group diversity even if it only affects small numbers of
students, because it is the novel and diverse perspectives those students bring, not their small numbers, that ties the
race conscious policies to the educational benefits of diversity). In fact, race conscious policies with a smaller
impact are preferable because they create less stigmatic harm. Moreover, as institutions gradually phase out race
conscious policies in accordance with Grutter’s sunset requirement, one should expect a gradual reduction in their
impact. See infra Part V.C.3.
170
644 F.3d at 307. See also Brown-Nagin, supra note 7, at 126 (noting that some Justices “might find the
appellant’s pleas for an upper limit on critical mass—a ceiling and a firm end point—appealing. Without some
concrete foundation for critical mass, Texas’s pursuit of the right mix of underrepresented students arguably is
limitless and would permit consideration of race in perpetuity [.]”). The “ceiling” and the “end point” here are
actually different concepts, and the term “stopping point” in Chief Judge Jones’ dissent could have two different
meanings: 1. The “ceiling”: A limiting principle on the weight of race in the admissions process. This is discussed
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Fisher, a college or university could use lack of representation of minorities in any class or major
as justification for a race conscious policy, and this emphasis on diversity at the classroom level
“offers no serious ground for judicial review of a terminus of the racial preference policy.”171
The Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
after several delays,172 the Court granted on February 21, 2012. The question presented in
Fisher is:
Whether this Court’s decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, including Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003),
permit the University of Texas at Austin’s use of race in undergraduate
admissions decisions.173
The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in Fisher on October 10, 2012, and the Court’s
ruling should occur in early 2013.
B. “Critical Mass” as Applied in Fisher
Fisher v. Texas represents the first post-Grutter litigation on affirmative action in higher
education to apply the “critical mass” concept. The arguments in Fisher with respect to “critical
mass” focused mainly on numbers and percentages of minority students. While the Fifth

infra in Part V.B.; or 2. The “end point”: the termination of race conscious policies altogether, in accordance with
Grutter’s preference for race neutral policies and its “sunset” provision. Part V.C.3 infra discusses how race
preferences can be gradually phased out.
171
644 F.3d at 307.
172
On September 15, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher, http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Fisher-petitonaff.-action.pdf. UT did not file a response brief, and the Supreme Court requested a response from UT by
November 30, 2011, later extending that deadline until December 7, 2011. See Lyle Denniston, Affirmative Action
Case Develops, November 1, 2011, http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/affirmative-action-case-develops/. UT
then filed its response, arguing against certiorari largely on inappropriate vehicle grounds. See Brief in Opposition
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher, (No. 11-345). Available at
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Fisher.BIO.Final.12.7.2011.pdf. The Court was first scheduled to consider the cert
petition in conference on January 13, 2012, and then deferred consideration to its January 20 conference, and then
again until the February 17 conference, before finally granting certiorari. See
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-345.htm.
173
Fisher v. Texas, 631 F.3d 213 (2011)(en banc denied), cert. granted (February 21, 2012)(No. 11-345),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/11-00345qp.pdf

Vinay Harpalani - Diversity Within Racial Groups

46

Circuit’s opinion espoused a more comprehensive definition of “critical mass,” its analysis was
also based largely on numbers.
1. Plaintiffs’ View of “Critical Mass”
The Fisher Plaintiffs’ analysis of “critical mass” focused solely on campus-wide numbers
of minority students. They argued that 21.4% minority (Black and Latina/o) enrollment at UT
was a sufficient “critical mass,” noting that in Grutter, the University of Michigan School of
Law only attained 13.5% to 20.1% minority enrollment in the years preceding the lawsuit.174
The Plaintiffs argued that “the concept of critical mass is defined as ‘a sufficient number of
underrepresented minority students such that such minority students would ‘not feel isolated or
like spokespersons for their race.’”175 The Fifth Circuit panel purported to reject this view and
was clear in noting that “critical mass” did not refer to “any fixed number.”
2. UT and Fifth Circuit Panel’s View of “Critical Mass”
The University of Texas had described “critical mass” in more abstract terms such as
“meaningful representation”; however, the University’s argument also centered on numbers. UT
argued that: 1. The Plaintiffs improperly combined African Americans and Latina/os for
purposes of assessing “critical mass”;176 and 2. In any case, “critical mass” had not been attained
within the student body or at the “classroom level.”177

174

Id. at 243. The Plaintiffs also argued “that minority enrollment at UT now exceeds the level it had reached in the
mid-1990s, pre- Hopwood, when the University was free to obtain any critical mass it wanted through overtly racebased decisions.” Id. at 244.
175
Br. Pl.s-Appellants 6, http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Plaintiffs.5th.Circuit.Brief.pdf. See also Fisher
at 243 (noting that the Plaintiffs contend that “the concept of critical mass is defined by the minimum threshold for
minority students to have their ideas represented in class discussions and not to feel isolated or like
spokespersons for their race.”).
176
Brief of Appellees at 46, Fisher v. Texas, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-50822), Available at:
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Fisher.v.St.o.Tx-Appellees.Brief.pdf (“Plaintiffs … commit the fatal
error of combining two different groups of underrepresented minorities in order to determine critical mass.”).
177
See id. at 48-49 (arguing that UT’s classroom study “provides a dramatic illustration of the absence of diversity
on campus at UT prior to 2005 … [and] … only further dramatized … that UT lacked sufficient diversity, including
a critical mass of minority students, across the entire student body …”).
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To support this argument, UT noted that a large percentage of its seminar classes, with
10-24 students, had only 0 or 1 Black, Latino, and/or Asian American students.178 These small
classes are presumably the classroom settings where racial stereotypes could be broken down
and cross racial understanding could be fostered, and unless there are at least two students of any
group, there cannot be diverse perspectives represented from that group. In that sense, diversity
within racial groups was implicit in UT’s concept of “critical mass,” although not stated
directly.179
UT’s response may have been a simple legal strategy for the lower court case, as it
directly refuted the Plaintiff’s claims in the clearest and simplest manner possible, and it
provided a more nuanced view of “critical mass.” Nevertheless, it did not fully articulate how
within-group diversity has its own benefits and relates to the “critical mass” concept,180 and it did
not clearly distinguish “critical mass” from numerical goals at the classroom level.181 Part V

178

See Fisher at 225 (According to[UT’s study of classroom diversity], 90% of these smaller classes in Fall 2002
had either one or zero African-American students, 46% had one or zero Asian-American students, and 43% had one
or zero Hispanic students.”)(internal citations omitted). Presumably, UT omitted the smallest classes—those with
less than 10 students—because they would be statistically unlikely to have more than 0 or 1 students from various
minority groups even if the numbers of minority students increased significantly.
179
Judge Sam Sparks’s district court opinion in Fisher also suggests this point. See 645 F.Supp.2d 587, 602-3
(W.D.Tex., 2009). (“Critical mass, which is an adequate representation of minority students to assure educational
benefits deriving from diversity, affects in a positive way all students because they learn that there is not ‘one’
minority or majority view. … [T]here is a compelling educational interest for the University not to have large
numbers of classes in which there are no students-or only a single student-of a given underrepresented race or
ethnicity.”).
180
In its brief to the Supreme Court, UT does note that “[p]etitioner completely overlooks the diversity within racial
groups that UT’s holistic plan fosters.” Brief of Respondents at 20, Fisher v. Texas, No. 11-345 (U.S. argued
October 10, 2012). Available at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Brief%20for%20Respondents.pdf.
UT’s Supreme Court brief also asserts that “[h]olistic review permits the consideration of diversity within racial
groups.” Id. at 33. However, UT does not elaborate upon this idea or analyze it in depth, as this Article does.
Additionally, the amicus brief for the Society of American Law Teachers, supporting UT and citing a draft of this
Article, notes that Black and Latino students admitted under UT’s race conscious policy “could contribute to
diversity in various ways.” See Brief of Amicus Curiae Society of American Law Teachers in Support of
Respondents at 23, Fisher v. Texas, No. 11-345 (U.S. argued October 10, 2012). Available at
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/11345%20bsac%20Society%20of%20American%20Law%20Teachers.pdf
181
UT argued that it “[d]id [n]ot [a]rticulate a [r]igid, [n]umerical [d]efinition of [c]ritical [m]ass. Br. Pl.sAppellants at 34, http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Plaintiffs.5th.Circuit.Brief.pdf. However, while its
definition may not have been “rigid,” UT did not show how “critical mass” could be defined in any terms other
numerical goals or ranges. See also infra Part III.D.1.
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infra will discuss some other ways in which the goal of attaining diversity within racial groups
might be used to justify a race conscious admissions policy.
Judge Higginbotham’s Fisher opinion noted that the Supreme Court in Grutter was
divided over the meaning of “critical mass,” but it cited Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion,
which defined “critical mass” through “reference to the educational benefits that diversity is
designed to produce.”182 The Fifth Circuit panel defined these benefits in broad terms: 1.
“Increased Perspectives” - those brought by diverse groups of students into the classroom, which
add valuable knowledge and make for engaging classroom discussions; 2. “Professionalism” –
preparing students for “work and citizenship” by exposing them to diverse people and
viewpoints; and 3. “Civic Engagement” – creating paths to leadership for individuals of every
race and ethnicity.183 However, the Fifth Circuit did not apply this definition further; it merely
adopted UT’s view of “critical mass” at the classroom level.
3. Judge Higginbotham’s Analysis of the Top Ten Percent Law
Beyond the ruling in Fisher, Judge Higginbotham’s analysis of the Top Ten Percent Law
illustrates the need to understand “critical mass” in terms of within-group diversity. The other
Fifth Circuit panel judges did not join this part of Judge Higginbotham’s opinion, which stated
that the Top Ten Percent Law “threatens to erode the foundations UT relies on to justify
implementing Grutter polices . . . .”184 Judge Higginbotham noted that the Top Ten Percent
Law did lead to an increase in minority enrollment, and that by 2008, 81% of incoming in-state
students at UT were admitted via the Top Ten Percent Law.185 As a consequence, the opinion
contended that the Top Ten Percent Law precluded UT from admitting minority students who
182

Fisher at 219.
Id. at 219-220. The Fifth Circuit panel also did not discuss the breakdown of racial stereotypes in classrooms,
which was the specific educational benefit that Grutter cited at the classroom level. See supra notes 45-48 and
accompanying text, and infra Part III.D.2.
184
Id. at 242.
185
Id. at 227.
183
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went to more competitive schools but did not finish in the top 10 percent of their graduating
classes, and who could contribute to diversity in various ways.186 Judge Higginbotham referred
to the Top Ten Percent Law as “a polar opposite of the holistic focus upon individuals” which
was sanctioned by Grutter, and noted that “its internal proxies for race end-run the Supreme
Court’s studied structure for use of race in university admissions decisions.”187 Further, he
opined:
the University does not respond to the reality that the Top Ten Percent Law
eliminated the consideration of test scores, and correspondingly reduced academic
selectivity, to produce increased enrollment of minorities. Such costs may be
intrinsic to affirmative action plans. If so, Grutter at least sought to minimize
those costs through narrow tailoring. The Top Ten Percent Law is anything but
narrow.188
Thus, in spite of ruling in favor of the University, Judge Higginbotham also concluded that
“[a]ppellants are correct that the decision to [enact the Top Ten Percent Law] … places at risk
UT’s race-conscious admissions policies.”189 Part III.D.4. presents a critique of Judge
Higginbotham’s analysis of the Top Ten Percent Law’s effect on the constitutionality of race
conscious policies.
C. Deference to Universities in Fisher
The issue of deference to universities on determining whether they had enrolled a
“critical mass” of minority students was a contentious point in the Fifth Circuit’s Fisher opinion,
and it will be a major issue when the Supreme Court considers the case. The question is
essentially what standard of review courts should apply when evaluating whether it is necessary
for a university to use race conscious admissions policies to attain the educational benefits of

186

Id. Unlike Judge Higginbotham, this Article argues that Grutter allows race conscious policies to be used
specifically to target the minority students noted here. See infra Part V.A.2.
187
Id. at 242.
188
Id. at 242.
189
Id. at 243.
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diversity. In the Fisher litigation itself, the two standards debated were “strong basis in
evidence”190 and “good faith.”191
1. Plaintiffs’ View of Deference
To determine whether a university needed to use race conscious admissions policies to
attain the educational benefits of diversity, the Fisher Plaintiffs argued that the Fifth Circuit
should adopt a “strong basis in evidence” standard, comparable to that used to evaluate the
necessity of remedial race conscious policies in “public employment and government contracting
cases.”192 This standard would place a significantly higher burden on universities than the “good
faith” standard suggested in Grutter.193 The Fifth Circuit panel rejected this argument.194

190

See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2675 (2009)(noting that “in the context of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment …[t]he Court has held that certain government actions to remedy past racial
discrimination—actions that are themselves based on race—are constitutional only where there is a “ ‘strong basis in
evidence’ ” that the remedial actions were necessary.”)(internal citations omitted); See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ. 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)(noting that “the trial court must make a factual determination that the employer
had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.”); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)(noting that City of Richmond did not provide a “strong basis in evidence for
its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.”)(internal quotation omitted).
191
See Grutter at 343 (“We take the Law School at its word that it would "like nothing better than to
find a race-neutral admissions formula" and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as
practicable. See … Bakke, supra, at 317-318, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.) (presuming good faith of
university officials in the absence of a showing to the contrary).”). Justice Kennedy and Chief Judge Jones
discussed the issue of deference in terms of strict scrutiny, and Part IV infra considers how strict scrutiny relates to
deference.
192
See Fisher at 232. (“Appellants urge that Grutter did not extend such deference to a university's decision to
implement a race-conscious admissions policy. Instead, they maintain Grutter deferred only to the university's
judgment that diversity would have educational benefits, not to the assessment of whether the university has attained
critical mass of a racial group or whether race-conscious efforts are necessary to achieve that end. … Appellants
would have us borrow a more restrictive standard of review … in which the Supreme Court ‘held that certain
government actions to remedy past racial discrimination-actions that are themselves based on race-are constitutional
only where there is a 'strong basis in evidence' that the remedial actions were necessary.’”). See also supra note 190
(discussing the “strong basis in evidence” standard).
193
See supra notes 68 and 191.
194
Fisher at 233 (“The high standard for justifying the use of race in public employment decisions responds to the
reality that race used in a backward-looking attempt to remedy past wrongs, without focus on individual victims,
does not treat race as part of a holistic consideration. In doing so, it touches the third rail of racial quotas. “). The
Fisher panel also cited Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 noting that “[w]hen
scrutinizing two school districts' race-conscious busing plans, the Court invoked Grutter's “serious, good faith
consideration” standard, rather than the strong-basis-in-evidence standard that Appellants would have us apply. ..
The Parents Involved Court never suggested that the school districts would be required to prove their plans were
meticulously supported by some particular quantum of specific evidence. Rather, the Court struck down the school
districts' programs because they pursued racial balancing and defined students based on racial group classifications,
not on individual circumstances.” Fisher at 233-34 (internal citations omitted). See also Parents Involved at 704-
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2. UT and Fifth Circuit Panel’s View of Deference
UT argued for a “good faith” standard to assess the need for race conscious admissions
policies,195 citing Grutter’s deference to universities in choosing their student bodies.196 As
noted earlier,197 the Fifth Circuit panel adopted this view,198 which was heavily criticized by
Chief Judge Jones in her dissent to the en banc denial.199
D. Critiquing Fisher’s Approach to “Critical Mass” and Deference
There are several critiques of the application of “critical mass” and deference to
universities in Fisher, including those noted by Chief Judge Jones in her dissent.200 Because the
two issues are intricately linked in the Fifth Circuit’s analysis,201 this Section considers them
together.
1. Focus on Numbers and Percentages
In spite of the Fifth Circuit panel’s elaborate articulation of diversity-related objectives in
Fisher, and its claim that “critical mass” should be defined in terms of the educational benefits of
diversity, rather than by numbers,202 the panel’s analysis focused largely on numbers. It adopted
UT’s notion of “critical mass” at the classroom level, but it did not articulate any theory that
5(noting that “[working] backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from
some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits … is a fatal flaw under the Court's
existing precedent.”)(internal citations omitted).
195
See Appellee’s Br. At 25-26, http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Fisher.v.St.o.Tx-Appellees.Brief.pdf
(noting that given “a university’s unique First Amendment rights … universities are entitled to ‘a degree of
deference’ and a ‘presumption of good faith’—‘absent a showing to the contrary’ … [c]ourts must therefore‘defer’
to the considered judgment of admissions officials—and must not interfere with their admissions policies and
decisions—unless the officials have acted unreasonably or in bad faith.”).
196
Grutter at 328-29.
197
See supra Part III.A.4.
198
Fisher at 233 (“Grutter teaches that so long as a university considers race in a holistic and individualized
manner, and not as part of a quota or fixed-point system, courts must afford a measure of deference to the
university's good faith determination that certain race-conscious measures are necessary to achieve the educational
benefits of diversity, including attaining critical mass in minority enrollment.”).
199
See supra note 168.
200
See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
201
Essentially, the Fifth Circuit deferred to UT not only the need for race conscious admissions policies, but also on
the meaning of “critical mass.”
202
See supra notes 57 and 182-183 and accompanying text.
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would allow Fisher to be decided on a basis other than whether a particular number or
percentage of minority students were present at the classroom level. One might argue that
because it did not adopt any fixed number as a “critical mass,” Fisher is not in conflict with
Bakke’s proscription of numerical goals.203 However, by its very conclusion that the numbers of
minority students in UT’s participatory size classes did not constitute a “critical mass,” the Fifth
Circuit’s Fisher opinion implies that some number or percentage—perhaps having at least two
Black, Latino, and Asian American students in every class—would constitute a “critical mass.”
If this is the case, then that number or percentage effectively becomes a numerical goal.204
Fisher then runs dangerously close to Justice Kennedy’s concern that “critical mass is … used …
to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.”205 And if there is no such theoretical
goal, then Chief Judge Jones’s critique206 that Fisher offers no meaningful ground for judicial
review is valid.207
2. Incomplete Consideration of the Educational Benefits of Diversity
As noted, Fisher discussed “critical mass” in terms of “the educational benefits that
diversity is designed to produce,”208 and the Fifth Circuit stated these as: “Increased
Perspectives,” “Professionalism, ”and “Civic Engagement.”209 The Grutter majority opinion
was more nuanced, specifically linking “critical mass” to the breakdown of racial stereotypes
through classroom discussions—by exposing students to a “variety of viewpoints” within each
203

See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 37 and 54 and accompanying text. Professor Brown-Nagin notes that “UT’s reliance on state
population figures and classroom- and program-level racial diversity numbers as critical mass metrics is likely to
elicit strong objection[]” and offers a “an alternative critical mass benchmark: the proportion of underrepresented
senior high school students in Texas whom UT deems viable candidates for admission.”). Brown-Nagin, supra note
7, at 118. This Article contends that any numerical benchmark for “critical mass” is likely to elicit objection from
Justice Kennedy as a violation of Bakke and Grutter’s proscription on quotas and numerical goals. See supra note
30. See also supra Part I.A. for a general critique of numerical “critical mass” benchmarks.
205
Grutter at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
206
See supra notes 170-171 and accompanying text.
207
See infra Part III.D.3.
208
Fisher at 219.
209
Id. at 219-220.
204
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group.210 While it also discussed broad societal benefits, such as producing a diverse
representation of leaders, the Grutter majority delineated the classroom functions of “critical
mass” more directly than Fisher, and implicit in those functions was a notion of “critical mass”
that included diversity within racial groups.211
This omission in Fisher is important because the breakdown of racial stereotypes is key
to understanding why “critical mass” must include diversity within racial groups, and why
consideration of such within-group diversity is important in applying Grutter’s principles.212
3. Problematic Analysis of the Top Ten Percent Law
Judge Higginbotham opined (not joined by the other members of the three judge panel)
that the Top Ten Percent Law, by increasing the number of Black and Latino students, raises
questions about the need for further race conscious policies.213 As noted earlier, mere numbers
of minority students do not speak to the constitutionality of a race conscious policy. Grutter
dictated that such policies are necessary to attain diversity within racial groups and break down
racial stereotypes, not to attain any particular number of minority students.214

210

Grutter at 319-20. (“[W]hen a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes
lose their force because nonminority students learn there is no "minority viewpoint" but rather a variety of
viewpoints among minority students.).
211
See id. at 333 (“The Law School does not premise its need for critical mass on ‘any belief that minority students
always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.’ … To the contrary,
diminishing the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School's mission, and one that it cannot
accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.”). See also id. at 330. ([T]he Law School's concept of
critical mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce. … These
benefits are substantial. As the District Court emphasized, the Law School's admissions policy promotes “crossracial understanding,” helps to break down racial stereotypes, and “enables [students] to better understand persons of
different races.).
212
See supra Parts I.C. and II. As noted earlier, UT did allude to diversity within racial groups in its Supreme Court
brief. See supra note 180. UT also noted the breakdown of racial stereotypes in its Supreme Court brief. See infra
note 277.
213
Fisher at 243. (“Appellants are correct that the decision to [enact the Top Ten Percent Law] … places at risk
UT’s race-conscious admissions policies.”). This Article does not endorse or critique the Top Ten Percent Law as a
policy. Rather, it just contends that Judge Higginbotham’s assertion that the Top Ten Percent Law “places at risk”
UT’s race conscious policy is erroneous.
214
See supra Part I.C.
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Moreover, as the Fisher panel itself recognized, minority students admitted under the Top
Ten Percent Law disproportionately enroll in certain schools and majors, and are
underrepresented in other majors.215 Earlier in the opinion, Judge Higginbotham’s conclusion
stated precisely why UT’s race conscious policy is justified in addition to the Top Ten Percent
Law:
It is evident that if UT is to have diverse interactions, it needs more minority
students who are interested in and meet the requirements for a greater variety of
colleges, not more students disproportionately enrolled in certain programs. The
holistic review endorsed by Grutter gives UT that discretion …216
Essentially, the principle espoused here is that UT’s race conscious policy is constitutionally
justifiable to attain within-group diversity among minority students, which yields the educational
benefits noted in Grutter.217 Judge Higginbotham’s statement that the Top Ten Percent Law
“places at risk UT’s race-conscious admissions policies”218 merely obscures this point and is off
base. This also illustrates the need for a coherent, well-articulated theory of “critical mass” that
explicitly includes within-group diversity.219
Additionally, in the UT admissions system, the Top Ten Percent Law serves largely to
admit Black and Latina/o students from segregated public schools.220 UT could justify its race
215

Fisher at 240 (“While the [Top Ten Percent Law] may have contributed to an increase in overall minority
enrollment, those minority students remain clustered in certain programs, limiting the beneficial effects of
educational diversity.FN147 For example, nearly a quarter of the undergraduate students in UT's College of Social
Work are Hispanic, and more than 10% are African-American. In the College of Education, 22.4% of students are
Hispanic and 10.1% are African-American. By contrast, in theCollege of Business Administration, only 14.5% of
the students are Hispanic and 3.4% are African-American.”).
216
Fisher at 240.
217
See Parts I.C. and II.C. In its Supreme Court brief, UT makes a similar point. See supra notes 180 and 277 and
accompanying text.
218
Fisher at 243.
219
See supra Part I.C.
220
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 n.10 (2003)(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)(“Percentage plans depend for
their effectiveness on continued racial segregation at the secondary school level: They can ensure significant
minority enrollment in universities only if the majority-minority high school population is large enough to guarantee
that, in many schools, most of the students in the top 10% or 20% are minorities. Moreover, because such plans
link college admission to a single criterion-high school class rank-they create perverse incentives. They encourage
parents to keep their children in low-performing segregated schools, and discourage students from taking
challenging classes that might lower their grade point averages.”); Jennifer L. Shea, Percentage Plans: An

Vinay Harpalani - Diversity Within Racial Groups

55

conscious policy on grounds of within-group socioeconomic and demographic diversity—to
admit Black and Latina/o students from predominantly White schools in more affluent
districts.221 Not only would these students be more competitive academically,222 but consistent
with Grutter’s mandate, they would add diverse perspectives and experiences within the Black
and Latina/o student populations on campus. One common stereotype of Black and Latino
students is that all students from these groups come from poor, inner city backgrounds. If UT’s
race conscious policy did indeed target the noted population, then it serves directly to break
down this racial stereotype, and thus to help attain the educational benefits of diversity noted in
Grutter.223 Moreover, the race conscious policy also adds to the overall diversity of viewpoints
on campus, as Black and Latina/o students from more competitive, predominantly White schools
have different experiences and perspectives than their counterparts who gain admission through
the Top Ten Percent Law.
While there are many possible critiques of the Top Ten Percent Law,224 it does not
automatically impact the constitutionality of UT’s race conscious admissions policy merely

Inadequate Substitute for Affirmative Action In Higher Education Admissions, Note, 78 Ind. L.J. 587, 615
(2003)(“In Texas, one critic of the Texas Plan remarked that the ‘very success [of the percentage plan] to produce a
diverse student body depends on continuing the de facto segregation of Texas high schools.’”).
221
At the Fifth Circuit, UT did not use this defense, focusing instead on “critical mass” at the classroom level. IT
did, however, raise the a similar point in its Supreme Court brief. See infra note 277.
222
The Fifth Circuit panel acknowledged this point. See Fisher at 240 (“[T]he Top Ten Percent Law hurts academic
selectivity: UT must admit a top ten percent student from a low-performing high school before admitting a more
qualified minority student who ranks just below the top ten percent at a highly competitive high school.”).
223
Grutter at 319-20 (“[W]hen a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes
lose their force because nonminority students learn there is no 'minority viewpoint' but rather a variety of
viewpoints among minority students.”). UT raised this point in its Supreme Court brief. See infra note 277.
Another possible reason to have a mix of minority students from high and low socioeconomic backgrounds is that
the former, who have often attended predominantly White schools in affluent districts or elite, private schools, may
help the latter adjust to elite, predominantly White universities. This argument was raised by Shanta Driver, a
lawyer for the student intervenors in Grutter, at a debate on affirmative action shortly after the Supreme Court’s
Grutter ruling. Social science studies can investigate whether such an effect does indeed occur and bolster any
arguments for within-group diversity by UT and other institutions.
224
See, e.g., supra note 220.
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because it increases the number of minority students.225 As long as UT’s race conscious policy
contributes to diversity in a unique manner, by admitting Black and Latina/o students from
different backgrounds and with different viewpoints than those admitted via the Top Ten Percent
Law, there is no problem with its constitutionality. Nevertheless, Part V elaborates further on
how courts can evaluate the contribution of a race conscious admissions policy, while also
applying strict scrutiny rather than the “good faith” standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit panel in
Fisher.
4. The Question of Different Racial Groups
There is another potential problem that can arise if courts try to determine whether an
institution has attained a “critical mass”: what if a race conscious policy is necessary for some
groups but not others? Fisher only dealt with numbers and percentages of Black and Latina/o
students, and the Fifth Circuit seemed to assume that if Black and Latina/o students had been
sufficiently represented, then the use of race would have been deemed entirely unconstitutional.
However, this position does not take into account Native Americans and other groups. Even if
there were sufficient numbers (and sufficient within-group diversity) for Black and Latina/o
students, UT could still potentially have justified its race conscious policy for the purpose of
admitting greater numbers of Native American students, or any other racial/ethnic group that is
underrepresented. 226 Moreover, even if the number of Native American students admitted via

225

This Article does argue that the Top Ten Percent Law or any other race neutral policy which contributes
significantly to racial diversity may allow more stringent review of a co-existing race conscious admissions policy.
See infra Part IV.C.2. However, it would still be erroneous to say that the race neutral policy automatically puts the
race conscious policy in danger; that would only be true if the race conscious policy did not uniquely contribute to
diversity above and beyond the race neutral policy. See infra Parts IV.C.2 and V.C.1.
226
UT’s policy did not grant ex ante preference to any particular group. See supra note 149. However, it can be
presumed, given the University’s arguments, that its race conscious policy primarily targeted Black and Latino
students. Between 2007 and 2010, UT enrolled no more than 26 Native American students in any year, and in 2010
the number was only 13. See Report 13: Implementation and Results of the Texas Automatic Admissions Law (HB
588) at the University of Texas at Austin 8, Office of Admissions at the University of Texas at Austin,
http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/HB588-Report13.pdf
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the race conscious policy were very small, these students may still add different perspectives and
contribute to the educational benefits of diversity.
Although not raised in Fisher, this example raises some problems with assessing “critical
mass” that could occur in another case. Unlike a point system (e.g., the policy rejected in Gratz),
race conscious policies in a holistic admissions system are not group specific. Many different
groups could contribute to the “critical mass” of perspectives that actualizes the educational
benefits of diversity. Using demographic data from one or two groups to determine the
constitutionality of an entire race conscious policy is problematic, as the policy could affect
enrollment of other groups that may still be underrepresented. It is quite possible that at least
some Native American students were admitted under UT’s race conscious admissions policy;
yet, neither the parties nor the Fifth Circuit addressed the impact on these students if the race
conscious policy is struck down.
5. No Meaningful Standard for Judicial Review
As noted earlier in Part III.D.1, the Fisher panel’s treatment of “critical mass” was
indistinguishable from a numerical goal. Moreover, even if there is no such theoretical goal
implicit in the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of “critical mass,” and even if there were no problem with
defining “critical mass” in terms of numbers, Chief Justice Jones’s criticism that the Fisher
opinion offers no meaningful ground for judicial review is valid.227 The Fisher opinion did not
provide any indication regarding what would constitute a “critical mass” at the classroom level
or how a court would review whether this goal had been attained; it merely deferred to UT. The
panel noted that “[i]f a plaintiff produces evidence that calls into question a university’s good
faith pursuit of those educational benefits [that diversity is designed to produce], its race-

227

See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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conscious admissions policies may be found unconstitutional.”228 However, it held that there
was “insufficient reason to doubt UT’s good faith conclusion that ‘the University still has not
reached a critical mass at the classroom level.’”229 Regardless of whether this was a valid
result,230 it leads one to ask: 1. What would be necessary, beyond the evidence presented by the
Fisher Plaintiffs, to create sufficient doubt? and 2. If there was such doubt, how would a court
evaluate whether the race conscious policy was, in fact, constitutional?231 These questions are
particularly important given Justice Kennedy’s concerns about deference to universities in his
Grutter dissent.232 The next two Parts take up these questions.

IV. Three Categories for Review: Implementation vs. Educational Objective vs. Need
As noted earlier, the appropriate standard of review—the level of deference given to
universities—was an issue of contention in Fisher.233 Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s Grutter
dissent distinguished between two categories of deference to universities, as he contended that
the Grutter majority “confuses deference to a university's definition of its educational objective
with deference to the implementation of this goal.”234 An analysis of Grutter and Fisher together
suggests that there are three separate categories of review when examining deference to
universities: 1. Review of the actual implementation of race conscious policies as implemented
to insure they comply with Grutter’s requirements, which requires strict scrutiny; 2. Review of
whether the university’s educational objective encompasses racial diversity (essentially, whether
228

Id. at 245.
Id. at 244.
230
This Article does not take a position on the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Fisher; it focuses on providing an alternative
basis for analyzing the case.
231
Part IV provides this Article’s proposed answers to these questions.
232
Grutter at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(noting that “courts … [should] apply a searching standard to race-based
admissions schemes, that would force educational institutions to seriously explore race-neutral alternatives …
[rather than] … be satisfied by … profession of its … “good faith …”).
233
See supra Part III.C.
234
Grutter at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
229
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the university has a compelling interest in diversity), which requires only “good faith” on the part
of the university; and 3. Review of whether race conscious admissions policies are needed to
attain this educational objective, which is the source of controversy in Fisher.235 After
delineating these three categories, this Part will focus on the last one. Justice Kennedy’s view of
this specific issue—how courts should review whether a university needs to use race conscious
policies to attain its educational objective—will be key to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Fisher.
A. Review of the Implementation of a Race Conscious Policy – Strict Scrutiny
The standard of review for race conscious policies as implemented is strict scrutiny: such
policies must adhere to Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles. The Grutter majority,236 the Fisher
three judge panel,237 Chief Judge Jones’s dissent to the Fisher en banc denial,238 and Justice
Kennedy’s Grutter dissent239 all agree here. As noted earlier, there are commentators who argue
that Grutter’s narrow tailoring test does not equate with traditional notions of strict scrutiny,240
and Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent contended that the Grutter majority did not actually apply
strict scrutiny when assessing the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policy.241
Nevertheless, in theory, there is agreement that strict scrutiny should be the standard of review
for the implementation of a race conscious admissions policy.

235

See Br. Pl.s-Appellants at 43, http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Plaintiffs.5th.Circuit.Brief.pdf (“The
only dispute with regard to narrow tailoring … is whether UT has demonstrated a valid need for its policy.”).
236
Grutter at 308 (“All government racial classifications must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny.”).
237
Fisher at 231 (“It is a given that as UT's Grutter-like admissions program differentiates between applicants on
the basis of race, it is subject to strict scrutiny with its requirement of narrow tailoring …”).
238
644 F.3d at 305 (Jones, C.J., dissenting)(“[T]he Court[‘s] … many holdings … have applied conventional strict
scrutiny analysis to all racial classifications.”).
239
Grutter at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“This Court has reaffirmed, subsequent to Bakke, the absolute
necessity of strict scrutiny when the State uses race as an operative category.”).
240
See Ayres and Foster, supra note 82.
241
Grutter at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“The Court … [in Grutter] … does not apply strict scrutiny.”); Id. at 390
(“The majority fails to confront the reality of how the Law School's admissions policy is implemented.”).
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B. Review of a University’s Educational Objective – “Good Faith”
The standard of review for a university’s educational objective—whether a university has
a compelling interest, given its educational goals and mission, in pursuing racial diversity—is
“good faith.” The Grutter majority,242 the Fisher three judge panel,243 Chief Judge Jones’s
dissent to the Fisher en banc denial,244 and Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent245 all agree here
also. Courts can presume on good faith that a university has a compelling interest in the
educational benefits of racial diversity and that the university’s goals and mission encompass this
interest.246
C. Review of the Need for Race Conscious Policy to Achieve a University’s
Educational Objective: The Question in Fisher
The standard of review for whether race conscious policies are needed to attain a
university’s educational objective (i.e., its compelling interest in racial diversity) is a key issue as
the Supreme Court considers Fisher. The substantive question is whether race conscious policies
are needed to attain the educational benefits of diversity, given that a race neutral policy (the Top
Ten Percent Law) has increased racial diversity. Is the standard of review a deferential, “good
faith” standard—as it is for whether the university has a compelling interest in racial diversity
itself—or is the question of need subject to strict scrutiny, as the implementation of race

242

Id. at 343 (“We take the Law School at its word … [and] … presume[e] good faith of university officials …”).
Fisher, 631 F.3d 213, 233 (5th Cir.2011)( “[S]o long as a university considers race in a holistic and
individualized manner, and not as part of a quota or fixed-point system, courts must afford a measure of deference to
the university's good faith …”).
244
Fisher at 644 F.3d 301, 305 n.3 (5th Cir. 2011)(Jones, C.J., dissenting)(en banc denied) (noting that a court “may
presume a university's good faith in the decision that it has a compelling interest in achieving racial and other
student diversity. But that is as about as far as deference should go.”).
245
See Grutter at 388(Kennedy, J., dissenting)(noting that “[i]n the context of university admissions the objective of
racial diversity can be accepted … but deference is not given with respect to the methods by which it is pursued.”).
Justice Kennedy’s language here suggests that he applies a deferential standard to reviewing a university’s
educational goals and compelling interest in seeking racial diversity.
246
See also Bakke at 319 n.53 (Powell, J., concurring)(“Universities … may make individualized decisions, in
which ethnic background plays a part, under a presumption of legality and legitimate educational purpose. So long
as the university proceeds on an individualized, case-by-case basis, there is no warrant for judicial interference in the
academic process.”).
243
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conscious policies is?247 The level of judicial review with respect to need was a major point of
disagreement between the Fisher three judge panel and Chief Judge Jones.248 In her dissent to
the denial of the Fisher en banc hearing, Chief Judge Jones was extremely critical of the Fifth
Circuit panel’s deference to UT with respect to the need for race conscious policies; she claimed
that such deference leaves no place for meaningful judicial review.249 Chief Judge Jones stated
that the Fisher three judge panel abrogated strict scrutiny by replacing Grutter’s narrow tailoring
inquiry with a “good faith” standard,250 and contended that the “good faith” standard applied to
a university’s compelling interest in diversity, not to the need for race conscious policies to attain
this diversity.251 Further, Chief Judge Jones criticized the Fisher panel for its conclusion that:
so long as a university considers race in a holistic and individualized manner, and
not as part of a quota or fixed-point system, courts must afford a measure of
deference to the university's good faith determination that certain race-conscious
measures are necessary to achieve the educational benefits of diversity, including
attaining critical mass in minority enrollment.252
Chief Judge Jones contended that “this statement apparently conflates the University's
compelling interest with narrow tailoring, or at least it misleads as to the importance of each
prong of strict scrutiny analysis.”253
A close reading of Grutter suggests otherwise: “The Court takes the Law School at its
word that it would like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula and will

247

The Fisher Plaintiffs advocated a “strong basis in evidence” standard to evaluate the need for race conscious
admissions policies. See supra notes 190 and 192 and accompanying text. The Fisher three judge panel rejected
this standard. See supra note 194.
248
See supra Part III.A.4.
249
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
250
See Fisher v. Texas, 644 F.3d 301, 305 (5th Cir. 2011)(Jones, C.J., dissenting)(en banc denied)(“The Fisher
panel opinion … supplants strict scrutiny with total deference to University administrators.”)(footnote omitted).
251
Id. at 305 n.3. (noting that a court “may presume a university's good faith in the decision that it has a compelling
interest in achieving racial and other student diversity. But that is as about as far as deference should go.”).
252
Fisher, 631 F.3d 213, 233 (5th Cir.2011).
253
Id.
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terminate its use of racial preferences as soon as practicable.”254 This language implies that the
Supreme Court in Grutter gave “good faith” deference to the University of Michigan Law
School with respect to the need for race conscious admissions policies. The Fisher three judge
panel also interpreted Grutter in this way.255
Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court decides Fisher, Grutter’s “good faith” deference
may well not survive. As noted, Justice Kennedy was quite critical of this deference;256 it was
his chief reason for dissenting in Grutter.257 Although his Grutter dissent addressed
“educational objective” and “implementation” rather than need for race conscious policies,258 it
is likely that Justice Kennedy will apply a higher standard of review to assessing need than the
Fifth Circuit panel did.
However, there is another method to examine this issue which is consistent with Grutter.
The distinction between ex ante and ex post deference is significant, in terms of the practicability
of judicial review. Ex ante here refers to assessing the need for race conscious policies before a
race neutral strategy has been tried and proven effective in increasing diversity. Ex post, on the
other hand, refers to the need for such policies after a race neutral policy (such as the Top Ten
Percent Law) has been implemented and proven successful in increasing racial diversity: this is

254

Grutter at 309-10. This language—specifically “at its word”—implies that the Supreme Court in Grutter gave
“good faith” deference to the University of Michigan Law School in determining the necessity of its race conscious
policies.
255
See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
256
Grutter at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(noting that “[d]eference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent
with it[,’” and criticizing Grutter majority for being “willing to be satisfied by the Law School's profession of its
own good faith.”).
257
See id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“If the Court abdicates its constitutional duty to give strict scrutiny to the
use of race in university admissions, it negates my authority to approve the use of race in pursuit of student
diversity.”).
258
See id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“The Court confuses deference to a university’s definition of its
educational objective with deference to implementation …”). Kennedy’s dissent here addresses the university
educational objective and the “implementation” of its race conscious policies, but not assessment of the need for
race conscious policies.
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the case in Fisher. This Article argues that ex post, it is more practical to apply a higher standard
of review and give less deference to universities.
1. Ex ante Review with Respect to Need: “Good Faith”
It would be very difficult for a court to assess, ex ante, whether any viable race neutral
alternative exists for enrolling a “critical mass” and attaining the educational benefits of
diversity. First, there are numerous potential admissions policies that might increase diversity in
one way or another, and Grutter stated that a university need not exhaust all race neutral
alternatives.259 Second, as argued earlier, “critical mass” cannot be measured readily,260 and it
would be difficult to devise judicial standards to determine whether a university has attained a
“critical mass” and the accompanying educational benefits of diversity. This is why Grutter
deferred to the “good faith” of universities on the issue of whether race neutral admissions
policies can adequately replace race conscious ones.261
One could thus interpret Grutter as applying “good faith” deference to universities ex
ante on the need for race conscious admissions policies. However, Fisher fits into the ex post
category, because a race neutral policy—the Top Ten Percent Law—is already in place at UT.
2. Ex post Review with Respect to Need: Strict Scrutiny
The ex post analysis—after a race neutral policy has been implemented, as is the case in
Fisher—is different. Here, a more stringent level of judicial review is practical and consistent

259

Grutter at 339 (“Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”).
Of course, Fisher could change this standard.
260
See supra Part I.C.3.
261
It may be possible for a Plaintiff to provide evidence, ex ante, that a race neutral policy could be as effective as a
race conscious one in producing diversity. To take a hypothetical example, a Plaintiff (or an advocacy organization
representing an appropriate Plaintiff) might conduct a study and show that if the University of Michigan
implemented a policy similar to Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law, then it could attain the same level of diversity as it
does with race conscious policies. If that study was presented as evidence, it might warrant less deference; the
University of Michigan would have to rebut the evidence or show how its race conscious policy contributed
uniquely to diversity.
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with Grutter.262 A court need not just consider the possibilities: it can instead assess the efficacy
of the implemented race neutral policy and compare it to the race conscious policy being
challenged. This can create a meaningful standard by which courts can review the need for race
conscious admissions policies.263 If an institution has already implemented a race neutral policy
to increase diversity, then a Plaintiff can make the argument that such a policy has yielded
sufficient diversity. The Fisher Plaintiffs did this, by comparing percentages of Black and
Latino students admitted prior to Hopwood and under the Top Ten Percent Law, and also by
comparing UT’s minority enrollment percentages with those of the University of Michigan Law
School at the time of Grutter.264
UT rebutted this claim by showing that diversity at the classroom level was insufficient.
However, the Fifth Circuit did not require UT to demonstrate that its race conscious policy was
the least restrictive means for attaining sufficient diversity at the classroom level. The panel’s
analysis did lay out why the Top Ten Percent Law did not yield sufficient diversity—because it
disproportionately admitted minority students in certain majors265--but the panel did not require
UT to show that its race conscious admissions policy explicitly aimed to admit students who
were not admitted through the Top Ten Percent Law. The panel rejected any standard higher
than “good faith” for reviewing UT’s decision to implement a race conscious admissions
policy.266

262

Grutter did not make the ex ante/ex post distinction and thus did not address ex post review at all.
Courts can also review Plaintiffs’ claims that race neutral policies would generate sufficient diversity, if those
claims are supported by sufficient evidence, such as empirical data. See infra Parts V.A. and V.C.1.
264
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
265
See supra notes 215-216 and accompanying text.
266
Fisher at 233 (“Grutter teaches that so long as a university considers race in a holistic and individualized
manner, and not as part of a quota or fixed-point system, courts must afford a measure of deference to the
university's good faith determination that certain race-conscious measures are necessary to achieve the educational
benefits of diversity, including attaining critical mass in minority enrollment.”). The Plaintiffs in Fisher had argued
for a higher standard of review. See supra notes 190 and 192 and accompanying text.
263
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Nevertheless, a more stringent standard is certainly possible and practical. As noted in
Part II.B.2, Professors Ian Ayres and Sydney Foster argue that Grutter deviates from the
traditional least restrictive means standard of narrow tailoring.267 Their critique centered broadly
on Grutter’s narrow tailoring requirements, but can also apply to the Fifth Circuit’s review of the
need for UT’s race conscious admissions policy in Fisher.268 This Article argues that Grutter is
consistent with a higher level of scrutiny ex post, for a race conscious policy implemented after a
race neutral policy has increased diversity.269 The Fifth Circuit could have required UT to
demonstrate that its race conscious policy actually made a unique contribution to diversity,
beyond that obtained through the Top Ten Percent Law. If courts are going to enforce Grutter’s
preference for race neutral alternatives over race conscious admissions policies,270 a higher
standard than “good faith” would be necessary. The standard proposed is a goals-means fit
which is considered the hallmark of strict scrutiny.271
Consistent with Justice Kennedy’s view,272 the next Part proposes and lays out the
“unique contribution to diversity” test, which focuses on diversity within racial groups as a
compelling interest and also employs strict scrutiny as the standard for reviewing the need for
race conscious policies to attain this interest.

267

Ayres and Foster, supra note 82.
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
269
See supra notes 262-266 and accompanying text.
270
See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
271
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
272
See Grutter at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“The Court confuses deference to a university’s definition of its
educational objective with deference to implementation of this goal. In the context of university admissions the
objective of racial diversity can be accepted … but deference is not to be given with respect to the methods by which
it is pursued.”).
268
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V. Unique Contribution to Diversity: Applying Strict Scrutiny in Fisher
This Part presents an approach to Fisher that is less deferential to universities than the
Fifth Circuit opinion and applies strict scrutiny: the “unique contribution to diversity” test. The
purpose of this test is to assess the underlying issue raised by Fisher—whether a race conscious
policy is necessary to attain the educational benefits of diversity when a race neutral policy is in
place and has increased diversity. The “unique contribution to diversity” test builds upon the
earlier analysis of diversity within racial groups and “critical mass,” but it does not require a
court to determine whether a “critical mass” of minority students is present, or to define “critical
mass” precisely in any specific numerical or other terms. Rather than attempting to determine
whether a “critical mass” is present, the test focuses on whether the race conscious policy
contributes uniquely to the educational benefits of diversity articulated in Grutter.
A. Assessing Unique Contribution to Diversity Instead of “Critical Mass”
Building on the analysis of standard of review and the general discussion of within-group
diversity, this Article argues that a court could decide Fisher by assessing whether a race
conscious admissions policy makes a unique, meaningful contribution to the educational benefits
of diversity articulated in Grutter, rather than trying to determine whether a “critical mass” of
minority students is present at the classroom or campus level.273 For example, in Fisher, after

273

The unique contribution to diversity test articulated here could work for the Top Ten Percent Law or for other
race neutral admissions policies that aim to increase diversity. Other race neutral policies that might increase
diversity include consideration of applicants’ socioeconomic background, first generation college status, “marked
residential instability” (defined in terms of moving from residence to residence frequently while growing up),
geographic residency, enrollment in low-performing schools, a guaranteed percentile admission plan (i.e., Top Ten
Percent Law), and admissions preference to all students (regardless of the race) at a school based on the school’s
socioeconomic or racial composition. See “Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve Diversity in
Postsecondary Education,” http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/guidancepost.pdf at 7 (discussing
Obama administration’s recommendations for implementation of race conscious admissions policies and race
neutral alternatives in higher education). The “Guidance” presumes these policies are “race neutral.” But see supra
note 15. Additionally, the “Guidance” recommends that institutions document their compelling interests and unique
educational missions and make records of race neutral alternatives that are considered, along with the reasons for
rejecting those alternatives. See “Guidance” at 7.
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the Plaintiffs presented evidence that UT had obtained sufficient diversity via the race neutral
Top Ten Percent Law, UT would have to articulate how its race conscious policy adds to the
educational benefits beyond the Top Ten Percent Law, and in a manner not practical via the Top
Ten Percent Law. UT could do this in at least two different ways:
1. Unique Contribution to Representation of Different Racial Groups
Although it was not addressed in Fisher, if UT was employing its race conscious policy
to admit more Native American students or any other underrepresented minority group, then that
would show that the policy is making a unique contribution to the educational benefits of
diversity. UT would also have to show that the Top Ten Percent Law did not admit sufficient
numbers of Native American students. This argument was not raised in Fisher, as both the
Plaintiff and UT focused on Black and Latina/o students; nevertheless, the argument could be
relevant in another case with similar facts.
2. Unique Contribution to Diversity Within Racial Groups
UT could also show that its race conscious policy contributed to diversity within racial
groups, consistent with the educational benefits of within-group diversity and the notion of
“critical mass” advocated in this Article. It could have argued that its race conscious policy was
needed to attain more Black and Latino students in certain majors,274 and presented evidence that
the policy was actually used to admit students in those majors.275 UT did in fact submit evidence
conveying the disparate enrollment of minority students in certain majors, although its argument

274

The advantage of an individualized, holistic race conscious policy is that it does allow student majors and
academic interests to be considered in admissions, and an admissions committee can target those majors that are
underrepresented. This would be more difficult with a non-individualized process, such as the Top Ten Percent
Law. See Fisher at 240 (“While the [Top Ten Percent] Law may have contributed to an increase in overall minority
enrollment, those minority students remain clustered in certain programs …”).
275
One possible confound here is that many students switch majors after enrolling in college. UT might also have to
show that a significant percentage of students admitted on this basis actually remained in the given majors, so that
classroom benefits of diversity are actualized.
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focused solely on numbers at the classroom level and did not convey the educational benefits of
within-group diversity. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit did not predicate its ruling in Fisher on any
such showing of evidence, applying a deferential “good faith” standard instead.276
Alternatively, UT could have demonstrated that its race conscious policy contributed to
socioeconomic, cultural, or geographic diversity among Black and Latino students.277 This
would also show that the race conscious policy made a unique contribution to diversity—perhaps
by facilitating the admission of Black and Latino students with different experiences and
perspectives than students admitted through the Top Ten Percent Law. If the policy allowed
enrollment of Black and Latino students from more competitive, affluent, predominantly White
schools, then it would contribute to such within-group diversity and thus to the educational
benefits of diversity espoused in Grutter.278 UT would also have to show that the Top Ten
Percent Law did not admit significant numbers of these students.
UT could also demonstrate that its race conscious policy contributed to within-group
diversity in some other unique way.279 So long as the educational benefits of diversity obtained

276

See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
This issue was not raised in Fisher at the district court or in the Fifth Circuit argument. However, in its Supreme
Court brief, UT did assert that Black and Latino students admitted under its race conscious policy “have great
potential for serving as a ‘bridge’ in promoting cross racial understanding, as well as in breaking down racial
stereotypes.” Brief of Respondents at 34, Fisher v. Texas, No. 11-345 (U.S. argued October 10, 2012). Available at
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Brief%20for%20Respondents.pdf. Further, UT asserted “[p]etitioner’s
position would forbid UT from considering … a [high-achieving, affluent Black or Latino] student’s race, even
though admission of such a student could help dispel stereotypical assumptions (which actually may be reinforced
by the top 10% plan) by increasing diversity within diversity.” Id.(emphasis in original).
278
See supra Parts I.C. and II.C. As noted earlier, one common stereotype of Black and Latino students is that all of
these students come from poor, inner city backgrounds, and if UT’s race conscious policy does indeed target the
noted population, then it serves directly to break down this racial stereotype, and thus to help attain the educational
benefits of diversity noted in Grutter. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
279
For example, Professors Kevin Brown and Jeanine Bell advocate for universities to distinguish between different
Black groups, such as Black immigrants (from Africa and the Caribbean), multiracial persons, Black Latinos, and
African Americans, when implementing their race conscious admissions policies. See Brown & Bell, supra note 8;
Brown, supra note 8. Additionally, the Pew Hispanic Center has published reports detailing diversity within
Latina/o populations in the U.S. See, e.g., Seth Motel & Eileen Patten, Hispanic Origin Profiles, June 27, 2012,
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/06/27/country-of-origin-profiles/ ( noting that “[t]here are differences across
[Latina/o] groups in the share of each that is foreign born, holds citizenship (by birth or naturalization) and is
proficient in English. They are also of varying age, tend to live in different areas within the U.S. and have varying
277
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by enrolling these students were consistent with those articulated in Grutter, and the group of
students targeted could not readily be admitted in sufficient numbers via the Top Ten Percent
Law or some other race neutral policy, the race conscious policy would be constitutional.
3. What Would be the Result in Fisher?
If the Supreme Court adopted the “unique contribution to diversity” test, it would vacate
the Fifth Circuit ruling in Fisher, but it would not declare UT’s race conscious policy to be
unconstitutional. Rather, it would remand the case for review based on the more stringent
standard proposed here. The eventual result would be an open question, dependent on UT’s
ability to demonstrate that its race conscious policy makes a unique contribution to diversity,
above and beyond the Top Ten Percent Law.280 Consistent with strict scrutiny, UT’s race
conscious policy would have to be narrowly tailored to fit the compelling interest of attaining
within-group diversity and its educational benefits.
B. Limiting Principle on Race Conscious Policies to Attain Diversity
One question left open by the “unique contribution to diversity” test is what is the
limiting principle on race conscious policies to attain diversity? The test itself does not place an
upper limit on the use of race conscious admissions policies, because there are an infinite number
of diverse viewpoints. In theory, a university could always use race to admit students with

levels of education, homeownership, income and poverty.”). Similarly, the White House Initiative on Asian
Americans and Pacific Islanders (AAPI) has emphasized the significance of diversity within AAPI groups. See
Arelis Hernandez, Spreading the Word on Asian American Diversity, DIVERSE ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., June 23,
2010, http://diverseeducation.com/article/13904c4/spreading-the-word-on-asian-american-diversity.html (“For
Kiran Ahuja, the executive director of the White House Initiative on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (AAPI),
communicating an accurate picture of Asian American diversity to policymakers across the federal government
represents a fundamental task … [.]).
280
As noted earlier, UT does assert in its Supreme Court brief that its race conscious policy adds to diversity within
racial groups. See supra notes 180 and 277. This Article argues, however, that UT must go beyond mere assertion
and actually demonstrate that it uses race in a manner to actually attain within group diversity and its educational
benefits.
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different viewpoints, even if vast racial and within-group diversity already exists within the
admitted class of students. What then is the limiting principle for the use of race?281
There are at least two possible answers to that question: 1. The point of diminishing
return for the educational benefits of diversity; and 2. The overall, aggregate weight given to race
in the admissions process. Although both are generally consistent with Grutter, the latter makes
more sense in light of the issues raised in this Article.
1. Point of Diminishing Returns for the Educational Benefits of Diversity
Inclusion of more diverse perspectives can always add to the educational experience.
However, there are diminishing returns to educational benefits of diversity. Given the time and
space constraints, students cannot experience all perspectives and educational opportunities that
might be available in classrooms and on campuses more generally. As noted earlier in Part II,
race conscious policies have costs. At some point, the stigmatic harm and other costs associated
with race conscious admissions policies begin to outweigh any additional benefits of diversity—
and one interpretation of Grutter is that beyond this point, it does not allow further consideration
of race.282
While this analysis is logically consistent with the theory of Grutter articulated in this
Article, it runs into a practical problem. It would be no easier for a court to determine the point
of diminishing returns for the educational benefits of diversity than it would to determine if a
“critical mass” is present;283 either determination is highly subjective and context dependent.

281

See also City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989)(rejecting “race-based decisionmaking [that is]
essentially limitless … .”).
282
Cf. Ayres & Foster, supra note 82 at 576-77 (arguing that courts should conduct a cost-benefit analysis of race
conscious admission policies). This Article does not contend that the Grutter majority itself viewed “critical mass”
in terms of such a cost-benefit analysis. Rather, the contention here is that the diversity/stigmatic harm calculus
noted here can be inferred from Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles and its notion of “critical mass.”
283
In one sense, determining the point of “critical mass” is the same as determining the point of diminishing returns
for the educational benefits of diversity. When there is a “critical mass” present, enrolled through the type of
admissions process that Grutter envisions, the educational benefits of diversity (racial and within-group) can
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Moreover, Grutter has other provisions which may be more practical and may also create a lower
bound for the use of race conscious policies—by limiting the weight that can be placed on race
in the admissions process.
2. Aggregate Weight of Race in Admissions
Regardless of the educational benefits of diversity, there may be an upper limit on race
conscious admissions policies based on the total aggregate weight that can be given to race in the
admissions process. Since Grutter mandates that race be used in a flexible, non-mechanical
fashion, based on individualized review,284 there is no systematic weight of race for individual
applicants in a constitutional, holistic admissions plan. However, the weight of race in
aggregate—for all applicants in a given admissions cycle—can be measured, 285 and this
aggregate weight compared to a designated limit that is determined by courts. Two provisions in
Grutter suggest that there is such a limit. First, the Grutter majority opinion notes that “[n]arrow
tailoring … requires that a race-conscious admissions program not unduly harm members of any

outweigh, by the greatest extent possible, the stigmatic harms, reinforcement of stereotypes, and other costs created
by race conscious policies necessary to attain that diversity. In this way, one can think of Grutter’s “critical mass”
concept and narrow tailoring requirements as joint provisions to maximize the breakdown of racial stereotypes and
promote cross-racial understanding—taking into account both the educational benefits of diversity and the costs of
race conscious policies.
284
See supra Part II.B.1.
285
In Grutter, the Plaintiffs made an argument based on the aggregate weight of race in the admissions process. The
Grutter Plaintiffs used data on the undergraduate GPAs and Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) scores of
accepted and rejected applicants to the University of Michigan School from 1995 to 2000, all sorted by race, and
calculated the odds of acceptance for members of each group. Part of the basis for their argument was that after
statistically controlling for academic criteria and other variables, Black, Latino, and Native American applicants had
a much higher probability of being accepted to the Law School than White and Asian American applicants. See
Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 821, 838 (E.D.Mich.,2001)(overruled 539 U.S. 306(2003))(Plaintiffs’ expert
witness concluding that “that ‘[a]ll the graphs comparing Native American, African American, Mexican American,
and Puerto Rican applicants to Caucasian American applicants show wide separation indicating a much higher
probability of acceptance for the particular ethnic group at a given selection index value.’”). But see Goodwin Liu,
The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 Mich. L.Rev. 1045, 1049
(2002) ((“In any admissions process where applicants greatly outnumber admittees, and where white applicants
greatly outnumber minority applicants, substantial preferences for minority applicants will not significantly diminish
the odds of admission facing white applicants.”) cited in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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racial group.”286 While this provision could be interpreted to limit the weight placed on race,287
Grutter held that “in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity
contributions of all applicants,” the [University of Michigan’s] Law School's race-conscious
admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants.”288 If the Supreme Court
follows this standard in Fisher, then undue burden will not be an issue: all parties concede that
the weight given to race in UT undergraduate admissions is less than that upheld in Grutter for
the University of Michigan Law School admissions program.289
Second, and perhaps more important when Fisher goes before the Court and particularly
Justice Kennedy, race cannot be the “predominant” factor in the admission of any applicants. As
Justice Kennedy stated in his Grutter dissent:
There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as one modest
factor among many others to achieve diversity, but an educational institution must
ensure … that race does not become a predominant factor in the admissions
decisionmaking.290
Nevertheless, while noting that a weight requirement could be read into Grutter’s individualized
consideration requirement,291 Professors Ayres and Foster contend that “the Grutter Court failed

286

Grutter at 341.
See Ayres and Foster; supra note 82, at 558 (contending that “evidence the Grutter Court viewed the weight
inquiry to be part of the individualized consideration inquiry comes in its discussion of the requirement that the
affirmative action plan not unduly burden third parties.”). Ayres and Foster further note that “the no-undue-burden
requirement …[is]…a requirement that is related to the weight given to race in admissions … .” Id.
288
Grutter at 341.
289
See Appellee’s Br. At 18, http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Fisher.v.St.o.Tx-Appellees.Brief.pdf (noting
that “UT’s consideration of race is even more modest than the policy upheld in Grutter.”). See also Fisher, 645 F.
Supp. 2d at 608 (District court opinion noting that UT considers race in its admissions process as a factor of a factor
of a factor.”).
290
Grutter at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also supra Part I.C.1. (arguing that perhaps the University of
Michigan Law School could not admit more Native American applicants without making race the predominant
factor in admissions).
291
See Ayres and Foster, supra note 82, at 558.
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to offer a theory for where the line should be drawn between programs that weight race too
heavily and those that do not.”292
This Article agrees that the allowable weight given to race, in aggregate, needs to be
clarified to provide a limiting principle for Grutter-like admissions plans. A full consideration of
the aggregate weight of race in a holistic admissions process is beyond the scope of this
Article.293 Moreover, although the Supreme Court could address this issue if it revisits Grutter,
it is not the immediate issue at play in Fisher itself.294 The purpose of the discussion here is just
to show how an upper bound on the aggregate weight of race in an admissions process can be a
limiting principle for the “unique contribution to diversity” test, and for race conscious
admissions more generally.295
C. Advantages of a “Unique Contribution to Diversity” Test
The “unique contribution to diversity” test described here has several advantages over a
direct assessment of “critical mass.” It directly addresses the critiques of the Grutter majority
presented in Justice Kennedy’s dissent and the critiques of the Fisher panel opinion presented in
Chief Judge Jones’s dissent,296 and it also helps to resolve other dilemmas faced by judges and
advocates trying to interpret and apply Grutter.
1. Ground for Judicial Review and Application of Strict Scrutiny

292

Id. Judge Garza’s dissent in Fisher also contends that the weight of race preferences is a necessary element for
meaningful judicial review. See Fisher at 251 (Garza, J., specially concurring)(noting that in Grutter, “the weight
given to race as part of this individualized consideration is purposefully left undefined, making meaningful judicial
review all but impossible.”).
293
The Grutter Plaintiffs’ argument, supra note 285, provides some indication of how aggregate weight of race
might be measured, notwithstanding Professor Liu’s critique, supra note 285.
294
All parties concede that the weight given to race in UT undergraduate admissions is less than that upheld in
Grutter for the University of Michigan Law School admissions program.See supra note 289.
295
An upper bound on the aggregate weight of race could also be useful in gradually phasing out race conscious
policies. Plaintiffs in future cases could argue for reduction of the allowable upper bound, based on demographic
changes, development of race neutral admissions strategies, or other developments that increase minority
enrollment. See infra Part V.C.3.
296
See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
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The unique contribution to diversity test directly addresses Justice Kennedy’s concern,
raised in his Grutter dissent, that:
courts … apply a searching standard to race-based admissions schemes, that would force
educational institutions to seriously explore race-neutral alternatives … [rather than] …
be satisfied by … profession of its … “good faith.297
It also quells Chief Judge Jones’s critique by offering “serious ground for judicial review of
terminus of the racial preference policy.”298 The test articulated requires a precise fit between
goals and means—characteristic of strict scrutiny. UT or another university could not just claim
that underrepresentation of minorities in particular majors justifies its race conscious policy; it
would have to show that the race conscious policy in question actually targets and admits
minority students in those given majors. The same would be true if the university contended that
the race conscious policy contributed to within-group socioeconomic or geographic diversity.299
The proposal here balances various interests, giving universities freedom to pursue
different admissions strategies which use race in accordance with Grutter’s provisions, while
also holding them accountable to Grutter’s preference for race neutral admissions policies. In
doing so, it adopts standard of review similar in stringency to that advocated by the Fisher
Plaintiffs.300 However, unlike the “strong basis in evidence” standard, which is a “backwardlooking attempt to remedy past wrongs,”301 the “unique contribution to diversity” test focuses on
“working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported
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Grutter at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(noting the “necessity for scrutiny
that is real, not feigned, where the … category of race is a factor in decisionmaking.”).
298
Fisher v. Texas, 644 F.3d 301, 312 (5th Cir. 2011)(en banc denied).(Jones, C.J., dissenting).
299
Of course, students often change majors while in college, and this could provide a basis for counterargument.
Socioeconomic and geographic diversity within racial groups are not malleable after admission in this way and thus
might be more viable bases for race conscious policies.
300
See supra notes 190 and 192 and accompanying text.
301
Fisher at 233.
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benefits.”302 The test applies strict scrutiny to review the need for race conscious policies to
attain diversity, when a race neutral policy has been or could be effective in increasing diversity.
It requires a university to demonstrate the utility of a race conscious policy if: 1. A race neutral
policy is in place that significantly increases diversity; or 2. A plaintiff provides sufficient
evidence that a race neutral policy would result in levels of diversity comparable to the race
conscious policy in question.303 “Good faith” would apply only when there is not sufficient
evidence presented to raise a question about the need for race conscious policies to attain the
educational benefits of diversity.304
Additionally, while the “unique contribution to diversity” test requires a goals-means fit
for race conscious admissions policies, it does not place an overwhelming burden on universities
to accomplish this end. Institutions of higher education have or can readily obtain all of the data
necessary to demonstrate how their race conscious policies contribute to the educational benefits
of diversity. Colleges and universities may need to collect more demographic data on diversity
within racial groups, and also to structure their race conscious admissions policies more carefully
to make sure those policies make a “unique contribution to diversity.” However, there is no
barrier that would prevent these institutions from readily doing so.305
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Parents Involved at 705.
Such evidence might be data that convincingly show how a race neutral policy would increase diversity at a
particular institution. The reason to allow such evidence to invoke more stringent review is to insure that
universities have incentive to explore race neutral alternatives to their race conscious admissions policies—a
particular concern of Justice Kennedy. See Grutter at 394(Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“Were the courts to apply a
searching standard to race-based admissions schemes, that would force educational institutions to seriously explore
race-neutral alternatives.”). In the absence of convincing evidence, courts would accept universities’ “good faith”
determination that race conscious policies are necessary, as dictated by Grutter.
304
In such a case, a court would only review if the race conscious policy conformed to Grutter’s narrow tailoring
principles; it would presume “good faith” on the university’s part regarding the need for the race conscious policy.
305
These measures may cause institutions to incur more costs, but colleges and universities have adjusted to similar
circumstances in the past: after Grutter, institutions had to expend more resources on holistic admissions and
eliminate more cost effective point systems similar to the one struck down in Gratz. See Gratz at 275
(“Respondents contend that ‘[t]he volume of applications and the presentation of applicant information make it
impractical for [LSA] to use the ... admissions system’ upheld by the Court today in Grutter. … But the fact that the
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2. Assessing the Unique (Even if Minimal) Impact of Race Conscious
Policies
The “unique contribution to diversity” test also addresses Chief Judge Jones’s contention
that the race conscious policy has a minimal impact;306 in fact, the test focuses on whether the
race conscious policy does have a meaningful, unique impact. It is possible that a race conscious
policy that admits only a small number of minority students can have a meaningful, unique
impact, if those students add to the diversity of viewpoints and experiences in a manner beyond
the race neutral policy.307 The admission of even small numbers of Black and Latina/o students
from certain majors, or from more competitive schools, would be justifiable if minority students
in those majors were not admitted sufficiently via the Top Ten Percent Law, as would the
admission of small numbers of Native American students via a race conscious admissions policy.

implementation of a program capable of providing individualized consideration might present administrative
challenges does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic system.”).(internal citation omitted).
306
See text accompanying supra note 169.
307
In its Supreme Court brief, UT also argued that “[t]he nuanced and modest impact of race under UT’s holistic
review plan is … a constitutional virtue, not a vice.” Brief of Respondents at 36, Fisher v. Texas, No. 11-345 (U.S.
argued October 10, 2012). Available at
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Brief%20for%20Respondents.pdf. But see Ayres and Foster, supra note
81, at 523 n.27 (“At least as a theoretical matter, narrow tailoring requires not only that preferences not be too large,
but also that they not be too small so as to fail to achieve the goals of the relevant compelling government interest.”).
This contention does not apply to race conscious admissions policies in higher education for two reasons: 1. Even a
small increase in diversity could have meaningful educational benefits: having one or two students from a given
racial group may be significantly better than having none—particularly if those students are vocal in class or active
on campus. In his Constitutional Law course at NYU Law, Professor Derrick Bell jokingly referred to Turquoise
Young, a Black female student who always voiced her opinions, as a “critical mass of one.” Professor Bell noted
that in some of his classes, one or two vocal students had a tremendous impact on class discussions—although he
acknowledged that this did not always happen. The variable and unpredictable nature of classroom dynamics is
another reason why “critical mass” is difficult to measure. See supra Part I.C.3. 2. As a practical matter, in a
holistic admissions system that is in compliance with Grutter (i.e., which uses race a flexible, unquantified plus
factor), such minimal use of race would be difficult to detect. Cf. Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New
Racial Preferences, 96 CAL L. REV. 1139, 1142 (2008)(raising “the question of whether race can in fact be
eliminated from admissions processes.”); Daniel N. Lipson, Embracing Diversity: The Institutionalization of
Affirmative Action as Diversity Management At UC-Berkeley, UT-Austin, And UW-Madison, 32 Law & Soc. Inquiry
985, 1015 (2007)(noting that “the line between race-based and race-blind policy making can be quite blurry.”).
There is no way to completely eliminate race from a holistic admissions process, as information about an applicant’s
race may be present throughout the application—via personal statements, student group membership, and even
names which are correlated with group membership. In a “race neutral” legal regime, Plaintiffs might be able to
prove significant use of race with statistics, but they would have a very difficult time proving or even detecting
minimal usage.
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3. Proper Application of Grutter’s “Sunset” Requirement
The “unique contribution to diversity” test also provides a reasonable path to apply
Grutter’s sunset provision and eventually phase out race conscious admissions policies. The
Fisher litigation and ruling seemed to presume that once a particular “critical mass” is attained, a
university would immediately have to stop using race conscious admissions policies. Grutter
stated that institutions should periodically review whether race conscious admissions policies are
necessary, with the goal of phasing them out in favor of race neutral alternatives to attain
diversity. 308 However, this cannot occur all at once when a particular “critical mass” is attained;
in fact, this Article has argued that neither courts nor universities can precisely define “critical
mass” or determine when a “critical mass” is present.309 Rather, the implementation of race
neutral alternatives should be an incremental process. Grutter’s “sunset” requirement is best
interpreted to require a gradual reduction of race conscious policies in favor of race neutral
admission policies “as they develop.” 310 The “unique contribution to diversity” test provides a
means for universities to gradually phase out use of race in admissions, and for courts to review
this process as necessary. Eventually, this process would lead to the elimination of race
conscious policies altogether, as espoused by Grutter, and the test articulated here provides a
means for universities and for courts to assess, at any given time, to what extent their race
conscious policies are necessary to attain the educational benefits of diversity.
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Grutter at 342 (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. … [i]n the context of higher
education, the durational requirement can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and
periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”).
309
See supra Part I.C.3.
310
Grutter at 342. (“Universities … can and should draw on the most promising aspects of … race-neutral
alternatives as they develop.”). This also reinforces the point in Part V.C.2 that race conscious policies with a small
impact can still be constitutional: one would expect a gradual reduction in the use of these policies if indeed
universities are seeking to apply race-neutral alternatives.
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4. Continued Constitutional Viability of Race Conscious Admissions Policies
Although the “unique contribution to diversity” test holds universities to a more stringent
standard to justify their use of race than the Fifth Circuit’s “good faith” standard, it will allow
race conscious admissions policies to be constitutionally viable for longer. The Supreme Court
is likely to narrow Grutter’s doctrine on race conscious admissions,311 and the “unique
contribution to diversity” test allows for this without compromising the enrollment of minority
students. This is the probably the best that proponents of affirmative action can hope for on the
current Supreme Court.312
5. Highlighting Justice Kennedy’s Values Conflict: Predicating Diversity on
Segregation
Finally, the “unique contribution to diversity” test can address an ironic twist in Fisher—
one that speaks to a values conflict in Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence, and in American society
more generally. In Grutter, the Supreme Court recognized the educational benefits of diversity
as a compelling interest, and even in dissent, Justice Kennedy recognized this interest313 and
reiterated it in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.314
Additionally, in Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence noted that “[a] compelling
interest exists in avoiding racial isolation,”315—a notion that would presumably be joined by four
other Justices.316 If in Fisher, the Court precludes UT from using race conscious admissions, it
would essentially be saying that the Top Ten Percent Law—a policy that increases minority
311

See supra note 7.
Professor Derrick Bell used to warn students in his Constitutional Law course not to “let the perfect be the enemy
of the good.” For advocates of affirmative action, the proposal in this Article is certainly not perfect, but compared
to overturning Grutter altogether, it is good.
313
See Grutter at 387-88(Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“Our precedents provide a basis for the Court's acceptance of a
university's considered judgment that racial diversity among students can further its educational task …”).
314
551 U.S. 701, 791 (2007)(Kennedy, J., concurring)( “As the Court notes, we recognized the compelling nature of
the interest in … diversity in higher education in Grutter.).
315
Parents Involved at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
316
Justice Kagan recused herself in Fisher, but she along with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor would
likely agree with Justice Kennedy here. See supra note 3.
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representation only because of racial isolation in Texas public high schools317—prevents UT
from using race to pursue the educational benefits of diversity.
This would be an ironic and unfortunate result. The “unique contribution to diversity”
test allows Justice Kennedy to impose strict scrutiny—thus satisfying his misgivings in
Grutter318—while still preserving UT’s ability to use narrowly tailored race conscious
admissions policies.

Conclusion
This Article has analyzed and elaborated upon the role of diversity within racial groups in
determining the constitutionality of race conscious admissions policies. It has done so in the
context of Grutter and Fisher, with an eye towards Justice Kennedy’s impending vote in the
latter. The theory of “critical mass” presented here reflects the compelling interest of breaking
down racial stereotypes that is articulated in Grutter, and that logically coheres with Grutter’s
narrow tailoring principles and the need for deference to universities. By analyzing these issues,
this Article explicates the principle that race conscious admissions policies can aim not only to
increase representation of particular groups of minority students, but also to attain diversity with
racial groups.
Further, in its analysis of Fisher, this Article addresses the scope of deference given to
universities with respect to race conscious admissions policies. It distinguishes deference on
three issues: implementation, educational objective, and need and delineates how standards of
review are different for each. The Article builds upon its earlier analysis of “critical mass” to
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See supra note 220.
Grutter at 395(Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“ If the Court abdicates its constitutional duty to give strict scrutiny to the
use of race in university admissions, it negates my authority to approve the use of race in pursuit of student
diversity.”).
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propose a tangible test for courts to evaluate the constitutionality of race conscious admissions
policies when race neutral alternatives are in place, or when a Plaintiff convincingly
demonstrates that they may work as well as race conscious policies. The “unique contribution to
diversity” test proposed here focuses not on whether a “critical mass” is present on campus or in
particular classrooms; rather, it centers more immediately on whether the race conscious policy
in question makes a tangible, meaningful contribution to the diversity of perspectives and
experiences on campus, beyond the race neutral policies that are in place. This test addresses the
issues raised by Justice Kennedy in his Grutter dissent and the critiques of Fisher posed by Chief
Judge Jones in her dissent to the en banc denial.319 The “unique contribution to diversity” test
also provides an interpretation of Grutter that allows strict scrutiny rather than “good faith” to
apply in a case like Fisher.
Finally, this Article highlights the values conflict in Fisher—the problem of predicating
campus diversity on school segregation through the Top Ten Percent Law. This conflict will be
one that Justice Kennedy will grapple with when determining his vote in Fisher. It is also one
aspect of a larger contradiction in America: the desire for an anti-essentialist, colorblind society
without the will to tangibly address the rampant racial inequalities that exist in this country.
Affirmative action in higher education is just one small manifestation of this dilemma, which is
certain to appear again and again in American law and politics. It would be an ironic and
unfortunate twist if the Court were to rule in a manner that predicates diversity in higher
education on racial segregation in K-12 schooling, which has actually been increasing for the
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See supra notes 167-171 and accompanying text.
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past 25 years.320 But more immediately, it is important to highlight this conflict in Justice
Kennedy’s own jurisprudence,321 as he will likely cast the deciding vote in Fisher v. Texas.
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See, e.g., Gary Orfield and Chungmei Lee, Historical Reversals, Accelerating Resegregation, and the Need for
New Integration Strategies, http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-anddiversity/historic-reversals-accelerating-resegregation-and-the-need-for-new-integration-strategies-1/orfieldhistoric-reversals-accelerating.pdf
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See Gerkin, supra note 6, for an excellent analysis of Justice Kennedy’s evolving race and equal protection
jurisprudence.
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